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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD:
AN INQUIRY IN LEGAL TAXONOMY
Todd S. Aagaardt
This Article examines the classification of the law into legalfields, first
by a general survey of legal taxonomy and then by specific examination of
environmental law. We classify the law into fields to find and create pat-
terns, which render the law coherent and understandable. A legal field is a
group of situations unified by a pattern or set of patterns that is both com-
mon and distinctive to the field. We can conceptualize a legal field as the
interaction offour underlying constitutive dimensions of the field: (1) afac-
tual context that gives rise to (2) certain policy trade-offs, which are in turn
-resolved by (3) the application of values and interests to produce (4) legal
doctrine. An organizational framework for afield identifies thefield's com-
mon and distinctive patterns, which may arise in any of these underlying
constitutive dimensions.
The second part of the Article applies this general analytical approach
to thefield of environmental law, proposing a framework for understanding
environmental law as afield of legal study and analysis. Two core factual
characteristics of environmental problems are, in combination, both common
and distinct to environmental law: physical public resources and pervasive
interrelatedness. Numerous and varied use demands are placed on environ-
mental resources, thereby creating conflicts. These use conflicts define the
policy trade-offs that frame environmental lawmaking, forming the basis for
a use-conflict framework for conceptualizing environmental lawmaking. A
use-conflict framework for environmental lawmaking carries significant ana-
lytical advantages over other models for conceptualizing environmental law
as a legal field.
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INTRODUCTION
What makes an area of law a legal field? What distinguishes areas
of law we regard as legal fields from the oft-cited joke of the "Law of
the Horse"?' What do we aim to accomplish with legal taxonomy, by
classifying the law into more specific subdisciplines? What kind of tax-
onomical scheme advances those objectives? What characteristics
must an area of law exhibit to advance those aims and to establish its
validity as a legal field?
1 According to one telling of the joke, the Law of the Horse would consist of Con-
tracting for a Horse, Owning a Horse, Torts by a Horse, and Litigation over a Horse. See
Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections on the Organi-
zation of Law, 50 Ajuz. L. REv. 71, 71-72 (2008) (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a
"New"New Haven School of International Law?, 32 YALEJ. INT'L L. 559, 572 n.85 (2007)); see
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
207 ("Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people kicked by horses; still
more deal with the licensing and racing of horses, or with the care veterinarians give to
horses, or with prizes at horse shows."). For additional references to and discussion of the
"Law of the Horse," see Easterbrook, supra, at 207, 214 (attributing the origin of the phrase
to Karl Llewellyn); Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41
WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 365, 368 (2006); Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health
Law, 41 WAKE Foitt-r L. REv. 391, 404-05 (2006); Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law
of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARv. L. REv. 501, 501 (1999).
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This Article addresses these questions, both generally and by spe-
cific examination of the field of environmental law. Environmental
law's existential angst provides fertile ground for considering ques-
tions of legal taxonomy. There is no doubt that something we call
environmental law exists. It has been roughly forty years since the birth
of modern environmental law in the United States. 2 Since then, envi-
ronmental law has matured considerably and has reached a certain
level of stability. 3 There seems little doubt that environmental law is
now a permanent fixture in the law. Nevertheless, the thrill of the
environmental-legal revolution of the 1970s has long since faded, the
content of environmental law has complexified dramatically over
time, and a marked frustration with environmental law's incoherence
has arisen. Environmental law is bemoaned, even among its advo-
cates, as highly fragmented 4 and unduly complicated. 5 There is a
strong sense that environmental law needs an overall vision or descrip-
tive framework that works to cohere the subject matter.6
2 The first major federal environmental case, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), was decided in 1965. The first mod-
em federal environmental statute, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006), was signed into law on January 1, 1970. See also RICHARD J.
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 48 (2004) (noting that 1970 saw, in addi-
tion to the signing of NEPA, "the creation of the President's Council on Environmental
Quality, the first nationwide celebration of Earth Day, the creation of the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, and the passage of the Clean Air Act's demanding and uncom-
promising air pollution control program").
3 SeeJames L. Huffman, The Past and Future of Environmental Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 23, 23
(2000).
4 See, e.g., Uwe M. Erling, Approaches to Integrated Pollution Control in the United States
and the European Union, 15 TUL. ENVrL. L.J. 1, 11-12 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, Foreword, 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. 383, 386 (2005); Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and
the Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 662 (2008); Elizabeth
Fisher et al., Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate About Environmental Law Scholarship,
21 J. ENVrL. L. 213, 219 (2009); Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinvent-
ing the EPA to Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 29
(1998); Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the Antiquities Act, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1333, 1338 n.22 (2002); Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the
Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 190 (1997).
5 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DE-
CISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 1 (1999); Peter Manus, Our Environmental Rebels: An Aver-
age American Law Professor's Perspective on Environmental Advocacy and the Law, 40 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 499, 516 (2006); Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law in the Law Schools: What We Teach
and How We Feel About It, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,251, 10,251 (1989); David A. Westbrook,
Liberal EnvironmentalJurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 621, 624-25 (1994).
6 See Farber, supra note 4, at 387 ("But without having any overall vision of the field,
it is unclear how either agencies or courts can produce a halfway coherent approach to
environmental law."); Fisher et al., supra note 4, at 219 ("[E]nvironmental law, as a subject,
... has no single guiding logic, no overarching doctrinal framework or no 'constitutional'
grounding."); Westbrook, supra note 5, at 621 ("[E]nvironmental law is not a discipline,
because it lacks the professional consensus on a coherent internal organization of materi-
als a discipline requires.").
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The project of attempting to identify such a unifying framework
for environmental law poses certain questions: What is environmental
law? When we describe a factual pattern, case, or rule as arising
within environmental law, what associations do we mean to convey by
that designation? What, if anything, unifies environmental law? Is en-
vironmental law a legal field orjust an amalgamation of laws arranged
under a general subject matter? Does environmental law function dis-
tinctively? What differentiates environmental law from other legal
fields?
Addressing such questions, whether in environmental law or in
some other area, is not just academic rumination. Classification is in-
herent and fundamental to the operation of law. Justice requires con-
sistency.7 Legal classifications enable consistency by designating
categories of similar situations to which a common set of principles
applies. The category assigned to a situation thus may determine how
the law applies to the situation. 8 The law works through categories,
and one of the more important types of categories employed in the
law is the legal field. We designate legal fields-environmental law,
labor law, criminal law-on the premise that those designations iden-
tify something important about how the law operates.
Thinking about what it means to designate a field of law and what
is required for an area of law to be a legal field therefore carries the
promise of improving our understanding of how the law functions.
An improved understanding of the law, in turn, may facilitate efforts
to improve the law. When we understand how the law functions, we
are better able to identify situations in which the law does not pro-
mote our desired objectives and to posit alternative approaches that
may be more effective. 9 Constructing an analytical framework that
brings together an area of law as varied and complex as environmen-
tal law will not itself resolve the recurring conflicts and difficulties that
7 See, e.g., Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 391
(1983); GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
293-94 (1970).
8 To take just one example, important innovations during the 1970s in the legal
rules that apply to residential property leasing were justified by virtue of a reassignment of
residential leasing from the category of traditional property law to contract law. See, e.g.,
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (rejecting
the application of "old common law doctrines" of "real property transactions" and relying
on contract principles to hold that a warranty of habitability should be applied to urban
residential leases); Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 771-73 (N.J. 1977) (rejecting the ap-
plication of "principles of property law" and relying on contract principles to hold that a
landlord has a duty to mitigate damages if the landlord attempts to recover rent due from
a defaulting tenant).
9 Cf Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimen-
sions, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 1015, 1070 (2008) (contending that a "three-dimensional view" of
property law "leads to a richer and more coherent view of the field" that enables "scholars
and lawmakers ... to tailor better solutions to current and future property problems").
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stymie environmental lawmaking, but it may well display those con-
flicts and difficulties in a new light and help to frame the decisions
facing legislatures, agencies, and courts and thereby facilitate more
effective lawmaking. A descriptive analytical framework can, more-
over, function as a sort of meta-framework for evaluating alternative
normative approaches to a field.
This Article's examination of legal taxonomy proceeds in two
Parts. Part I addresses the general question of what makes an area of
law a legal field. We classify the law into fields to find and create pat-
terns, which render the law coherent and understandable. A legal
field is a group of situations unified by a pattern or set of patterns that
is both common and distinctive to the field. 10 We can conceptualize a
legal field as the interaction of four underlying constitutive dimen-
sions of the field: (1) a factual context that gives rise to (2) certain
policy trade-offs, which are in turn resolved by (3) the application of
values and interests to produce (4) legal doctrine. An organizational
framework for a field identifies the field's common and distinctive pat-
terns, which may arise in any of these underlying constitutive dimen-
sions. The more that common and distinctive features predominate
within the field, the more useful the field is likely to be as an analytical
category. In addition, ideally a legal field also has transsubstantive im-
plications that extend beyond the field.
Part II applies this general approach to the field of environmen-
tal law, proposing a framework for understanding environmental law
as a field of legal study and analysis. Part II begins by examining and
critiquing two prominent prior efforts to explain environmental law as
a coherent legal field." It argues that these efforts ultimately fail, pri-
marily because their frameworks are unduly focused on environ-
mentalism, which renders their characterizations of environmental
law incomplete, rather than on identifying a pattern of features that is
common and distinctive to environmental law.
Part II then proceeds to set forth a superior organizational frame-
work for environmental law, a framework rooted in the constitutive
dimensions of the field. It argues that environmental problems-the
factual context of environmental lawmaking-involve two core factual
characteristics that are, in combination, both common and distinct to
environmental law: physical public resources and pervasive interrelatedness.
Numerous and varied use demands are placed on these environmen-
tal resources, thereby creating conflicts. These use conflicts define
the policy trade-offs that frame environmental lawmaking and form
the basis for a use-conflict framework for conceptualizing environmental
10 See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
11 A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAaND USE &
ENrvrL. L. 213 (2004); Westbrook, supra note 5.
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lawmaking. These use conflicts derive from the specific factual con-
text of the decision at issue, however, and cannot be meaningfully
generalized into abstractions. For this reason, the environmental-law
doctrine that results from the resolution of environmental use con-
flicts does not fit a clear, general pattern. There are no core princi-
ples that unify all of substantive environmental-law doctrine. Despite
the absence of such principles, the analytical framework set forth in
this Article, which emphasizes the role of use conflicts in environmen-
tal lawmaking and the generation of use conflicts through competi-
tion among pervasively interrelated uses of physical public resources,
meaningfully coheres the field of environmental law. This framework
also provides a relatively value-neutral structure by which to evaluate
alternative policy options or alternative normative approaches.
I
WHAT MAKES AN AREA OF LAW A LEGAL FIELD?
A. Legal Taxonomy and Legal Fields
We organize the law into distinct fields as a form of legal taxon-
omy, on the premise that classification will facilitate an improved un-
derstanding of the law.12 As Emily Sherwin has observed, significant
benefits can result from a useful categorization of the law:
[O] rganisation of law into categories .. .facilitate [s] legal analysis
and communication of legal ideas .... [A] comprehensive formal
classification of law provides a vocabulary and grammar that can
12 See Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 305, 306 (2000) ("Putting information in context gives the researcher a
powerful tool for understanding legal information."); Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law:
Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM.J. CoMP. L. 5, 5 (1997) ("[Taxon-
omy] provides the intellectual framework of the law and it makes the law's complexity
more manageable."); Linda Silberman, Transnational Litigation: Is There a "Field"? A Tribute
to Hal Maier, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1427, 1430 (2006) ("[T]ransnational litigation has
become a field because the discrete pieces can only be understood in relation to each
other and to the whole .... ."); id. at 1431 ("The study of transnational litigation contains
interrelated elements that must be brought together in order to understand and appreci-
ate any one of them."); Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241,
243 (2000) ("Gaining knowledge of a subject is largely a matter of learning how to classify
the subject and its constituent elements."); id. at 244 ("We draw classifications in law not
just for the sake of classifying but because classifying rules, cases, and so on is a large part
of what acquiring legal knowledge means."); DanielJ. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U.
PA. L. REv. 477, 484 (2006) (contending that a good taxonomy "is not simply an attempt to
catalog existing laws," but advances our understanding of the area of the law and thereby
"provide [s] a useful framework for its future development"); see also GEOFFREY C. BOWKER &
SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1 (1999)
("To classify is human."); 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAw xxxi-ii (Peter Birks ed., 2000) ("The
search for order is indistinguishable from the search for knowledge."). But see Roscoe
Pound, Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REv. 933, 938 (1924) ("[W]e must renounce ex-
travagant expectations as to what may be accomplished through classification of law....
For I doubt whether a classification is possible that will do anything more than classify.").
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make law more accessible and understandable to those who must
use and apply it. It assembles legal materials in a way that allows
observers to view the law as a whole law. This in turn makes it easier
for lawyers to argue effectively about the normative aspects of law,
for judges to explain their decisions, and for actors to coordinate
their activities in response to law. 13
Not every legal categorization, however, necessarily produces
such benefits, and there are innumerable theoretically available classi-
fications from which to choose. Any particular situation that arises in
the law potentially can be classified into numerous different catego-
ries. For example, an injury in the workplace could be characterized
as a matter of, among other subject-matter categories, labor law, em-
ployment law, occupational safety and health law, tort law, criminal
law, federal law, state law, common law, and statutory law. Each sub-
ject-matter category, in turn, can be defined and characterized in nu-
merous different ways-that is, there are many possible
understandings of what it means to fall within the categories of tort
law, employment law, and so forth. The initial task of the legal taxon-
omist, therefore, is to find, among the immense variety of categoriza-
tions that theoretically can be employed to classify the law, those
categorizations that yield the benefits that Sherwin notes.
Classification systems operate by employing organizational
frameworks to differentiate among the constituent elements being or-
ganized, thus determining which elements fall within which catego-
ries. A classification is useful if the organizational framework reflects
patterns that reveal something important to us about the materials
being classified. 14 If a classification system is helpful, applying the or-
ganizational framework differentiates among the elements in a man-
ner that signals salient similarities and differences, bringing some
degree of coherence to an otherwise undifferentiated mass.
15
13 Emily Sherwin, Legal Positivism and the Taxonomy of Private Law, in STRUCTURE AND
JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS FOR PETER BIR s 103, 119 (Charles Rickett & Ross
Grantham eds., 2008) (footnotes omitted); see also Mattei, supra note 12, at 6 ("Taxonomy
plays an important role in transferring knowledge from one area of the law to another.");
Smith, supra note 12, at 244 ("Classifying a particular decision ... is a claim about the
meaning of the decision, as well as about how the decision should be applied in the future.
To make good decisions courts need to distinguish like from unlike: to understand the law
scholars need to do the same thing. When lawyers and scholars argue about how a case
should be decided, or about the meaning of a particular rule, they are in large part argu-
ing about how to classify the case or the rule.").
14 See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 370 ("[D]o we gain insights from thinking as a group
about the set of legal materials grouped under this rubric?").
15 SeeJay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 674
(1989) ("Classification is designed to reduce the complexity of complex analysis and to
highlight similarities and differences among the objects classified."); Kenneth R. Richards,
Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENvTrL. L. & POL'CY F. 221, 232
(2000) ("A useful taxonomy ... inform[s] the user about the important similarities and
differences among the various items in the classification.. .. Taxonomy generally employs
2272010]
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Thus, the goal of legal taxonomy is to identify significant patterns
in the law. Which patterns are significant and therefore worthy of
identification may depend on the specific objective of the classifica-
tion.' 6 In general, however, we would expect a pattern to be signifi-
cant and worthy of identification if it is legally relevant-that is, if it
affects the application of the law.
Not all classifications of the law and legal taxonomy look to cate-
gorize the law into legal fields. West Publishing Company's Key Num-
ber System, for example, sorts legal issues into more than 400
alphabetically arranged topic fields.' 7 As to the practice, teaching,
study, and deciding of law, however, legal fields are probably the most
important classification of the law. The designation of a situation as
falling within, or outside of, a particular legal field often carries pow-
erful associations about how the situation should be understood and
what legal rule should apply to it.'8
A field of law primarily functions as a frame of reference for un-
derstanding the set of situations that falls within the field, and to some
extent for distinguishing situations within the field from those outside
of the field. The field's organizational framework identifies the pat-
tern or patterns that it associates with the field.19 The usefulness of
the field varies depending on how well that pattern explains the vari-
an organizing principle to differentiate among the elements of the classification." (foot-
notes omitted)).
16 Cf 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAw, supra note 12, at xliii (noting that "different classifica-
tions simply answer different questions").
17 See WEST PUBLISHING CORP., THE WEST KEY NUMBER SYSTEM: ALPHABETICAL LIST OF
DIGEST Topics 1 (2009), available at http://west.thomson.com/documentation/westlaw/
wlawdoc/wlres/keynmb06.pdf; see also Berring, supra note 12, at 309 (noting that the
American Digest System "was built on a structure of topics and key numbers that allows for
the detailed sorting of legal issues into neat categories and sub-categories" and "purports
to describe every possible legal situation that can exist").
18 See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660-62 (1987) (holding that
state statute of limitations for tort actions applies to federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, because such actions sound in tort rather than contract); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v.
Goodwin, 920 So. 2d 427, 433 (Miss. 2006) (noting that choice-of-law rules depend on the
substantive area of law into which a case falls); Hydro Conduit Corp. v. Kemble, 793 P.2d
855, 859-61 (N.M. 1990) (applying state statute that conferred sovereign immunity over
"actions based on contract" and holding that an action seeking restitution for unjust en-
richment fell within the category of contract for purposes of the statute).
19 See Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1, 17 (2008) (contending that the author's proposed framework provides a "lens" for
understanding her field of health law through "greater intellectual coherence"); see also id.
at 4 (noting the author's objective of developing "a more holistic and integrated conceptu-
alization of health law"); id. at 19 (noting that the debate over the proper framework for
health law "centers on how best to capture the uniqueness and coherence (if any) of
health law").
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ous situations that the field encompasses. This explanatory power,20
in turn, depends on several factors.
First, a field's explanatory power depends on the extent to which
situations that arise within the field exhibit a recognizable pattern.
The stronger the pattern is, the more powerful the field is as a frame
of reference for analyzing the situations it encompasses.
Second, a field's explanatory power depends on the simplicity of
the pattern. All else being equal, the simpler the pattern is, the more
powerful the field is as a means of explaining the situations it
includes.
Third, a field's explanatory power depends on the extent to
which the pattern predominates within the field; that is, whether the
characteristics that exhibit the pattern predominate over other char-
acteristics that do not. Where the characteristics that exhibit the pat-
tern predominate over other characteristics, the pattern associated
with the field will carry a greater power to explain situations within the
field.
Fourth, a field's explanatory power depends on the extent to
which a single pattern explains the various issues that arise within the
field. A framework that is helpful only in explaining certain issues
that arise within a field is less helpful than a framework that explains
many different issues within the field.
Fifth, a field's explanatory power depends on the breadth of the
field-that is, the scope of situations that arise within the field. The
more situations that can be viewed as arising within the field (and that
exhibit the pattern that coheres the field), the broader the field and
the more powerful the field is as a frame of reference.
The perfect framework for a perfectly coherent field, therefore,
would fully explain various issues that arise in a vast scope of situations
with a simple organizing framework.
B. The Allure-and Hazard-of Coherence
Taxonomy inevitably and inherently is a quest for coherence. We
employ taxonomy to identify a pattern that functionally coheres the
field of study by adding some amount of logical order, consistency,
and clarity. This is the benefit of taxonomy, and it is an important
benefit. As Ann Althouse has observed: "Finding a scheme of coher-
ence, a framework, really is the process of understanding. To merely
20 I use the term "explanatory power" here to mean broadly the power to explain, not
just predictive capability, as it sometimes is used. See, e.g., Anatol Rapoport, Explanatory
Power and Explanatory Appeal of Theories, 24 SYNTHESE 321, 322 (1972). Explanatory power as
I use the term includes, for example, what Anatol Rapoport called explanatory appeal, which
he defined as "'integrative potential', the extent to which many apparently unrelated
events are seen in the light of the theory to be related." Id. at 324.
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observe that the field is chaotic, arcane, or incoherent is to decline
the work of understanding.... [W] e must search for frameworks and
coherencies as a necessary means of thinking about the subject."2 1
Coherence thus exerts a strong attractive force for the legal pro-
fession, inducing what Theodore Ruger has called a "coherence im-
pulse."22 Coherence has "dramatic potential for explanation and
illumination"2 3 and "promises a vision of law that is unified, predict-
able and rational." 24 As a result, coherent fields are easier to learn,
practice, decide, and theorize. 25 Not coincidentally, the archetypal
common-law fields that the legal profession intuitively regards as ideal
legal fields-fields that form the foundation for law school curric-
ula-are often characterized by strongly coherent, even essentialist,
models. 26 For newer areas of law, coherence is perceived as a ticket to
legitimacy as a legal field.2 7 As a result, much of the work of legal
21 Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 VAND. L. REv.
993, 1001 (1994).
22 Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law's Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625, 628 (2008).
23 Id. at 630; see also id. (noting that "the academic preference for elegant and sparse
theoretical coherence reflects a worthy intellectual goal of discernment and illumina-
tion"); id. at 631 ("In this framework the cure for the malaise is the imposition of some
grand unifying theme, the discovery of which is a central test of the field.").
24 Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Common Law Conceptual-
ism, 52 VILL. L. REv. 487, 511 (2007); see also Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal
Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 CAL. L. REv. 15, 17 (1987) (ascribing to Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell's approach to studying the common law the belief that "[aill of
the pieces of the puzzle could be assembled into a coherent picture"); Brian Langille &
Patrick Macklem, The Political Economy of Fairness: Frank Iacobucci's Labour Law Jurisprudence,
57 U. TORONTO L.J. 343, 343 (2007) (characterizing coherence as "a necessary precondi-
tion to principled decision making").
25 On the other hand, the legal profession may in some respects have an interest in
maintaining at least some inscrutability in the law. SeeJohn Earnhardt, Cisco General Coun-
sel on State of Technology in the Law, Cisco: The Platform (Jan. 25, 2007, 4:13 PM), http://
blogs.cisco.com/news/comments/cisco-general-counsel-on stateof_technology-inthe
-law/ (noting that Richard Susskind observed that when "law gets standardized, it can be
outsourced, co-sourced, integrated, aggregated, syndicated and shared," empowering cli-
ents vis-A-vis their attorneys).
26 See, e.g., John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical
Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARv. L. REv. 690, 706
(2001) (noting that the negligence principle in torts "satisfied the conceptualist desire to
unify and systematize tort law at an exceedingly high level of generality around a single
abstract principle"); Randy E. Barnett, The Richness of Contract Theory, 97 MICH. L. REv.
1413, 1414 (1999) (reviewing ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RCHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW (1997)) (noting the
rise in the 1970s and 1980s of contracts scholarship "in search of unifying theories of legal
doctrine").
27 See Ruger, supra note 22, at 630 ("[T]he intellectual pressure to achieve singular
coherence is felt most acutely by newer fields aspiring to more established, if not canoni-
cal, status."); see also Steven Price, Media Law in New Zealand, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L.
REv. 665, 665 (2005) (book review) (tying recognition of the coherence of media law to
"[t]he emergence of media law as a legitimate field of study"); Saiman, supra note 24, at
519 ("In a variety of ways, the legitimacy of restitution [as a legal field] is entirely bound up
in the debate regarding the conceptual coherence of the proposed analytic category.").
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taxonomists has been to develop frameworks that bring coherence to
particular areas of law. In considering the coherence of a legal field,
we can think of coherence as the strength, simplicity, and predomi-
nance of the field's patterns.28
Not all areas of law, however, are easily susceptible to a coherent
account; some areas are just less coherent. 29 An area of law's coher-
ence depends on, among other things, the extent to which it exhibits
strong, recognizable patterns,30 and several factors may influence the
existence of such patterns.
First, an area of law is more likely to exhibit consistency if its fac-
tual patterns have a great deal of commonality. All else being equal,
the more similar the factual circumstances of situations that arise
within the area, the more consistency we would expect in the law that
governs those situations. Second, areas of law in which a single value
or interest has an influence are more likely to follow strong, recogniz-
able patterns.
The historical development of water law in the western United
States illustrates the effect of both these factors. Water law in the west-
ern United States developed as a relatively simple system for allocating
irrigation water to local agriculture on a first-in-time priority basis. 31
Over time, as the West developed, the factual context changed and
became more varied and complex. Development brought greater de-
mand for water, leading to the construction of large-scale dams and
aqueduct systems to store and deliver water.32 Development also
brought a greater diversity of uses making claims to water resources,
including industrial uses and municipal drinking-water systems. 3 3 In
addition, increased environmental consciousness led to greater recog-
nition of so-called "instream uses" that benefit the natural environ-
ment, such as fish populations. 3 4 Together, the diversification of the
28 See supra text following note 20 (identifying the strength, simplicity, and predomi-
nance of a field's pattern as some of the factors that determine a field's explanatory
power).
29 See, e.g., Saiman, supra note 24, at 518 (listing the field of sports law, among others,
as one for which a central conceptual principle does not exist but that still is an emerging
field of law).
30 See supra text following note 20.
31 See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1873, 1898 (2005); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 769, 770 (2001).
32 Tarlock, supra note 31.
33 See id.
34 See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in
Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 656 n.100 (2008) ("[S]ome Western states have recog-
nized rights in instream flows, which entitle their holders to refrain from diversion and
consumption of water, in order to protect endangered fish, wildlife and habitats, or for
recreational purposes."); A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management
and Western Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. EvrrL. L. &
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factual context and the decline of resource exploitation as the overrid-
ing value of Western water law led to the development of new rules
and principles that have rendered the field more complicated and less
coherent.
Third, centralized and well-coordinated lawmaking processes are
more likely to produce law that follows a strong pattern; thus, areas in
which law is created by such processes are more likely to exhibit
strong, recognizable patterns. For example, whether an area of law is
governed primarily by detailed legislation or by judicial decisions
likely influences the coherence of the area. In judicial lawmaking, the
predominance of reasoning from precedent creates a strong influence
favoring coherence. Judicial decision making intentionally looks to
cohere precedential materials and to produce a new decision consis-
tent with that coherent understanding of precedent; the most funda-
mental path ofjudicial reasoning is to identify a pattern in the law and
then to follow that pattern.3 5 Statutory lawmaking, on the other hand,
lacks a similar coherence-favoring force. Legislatures enact and
amend different statutes in different lawmaking moments, each associ-
ated with its own particular context and its own set of compromises
POL' 983, 994-95 (2008) ("Non-consumptive uses have long been recognized, but these
uses, such as fishery maintenance flows, were relatively minor until the 1970s.").
35 See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LECAL REASONING 1 (1949) (describ-
ing the three-step process of legal reasoning based on precedent: "similarity is seen be-
tween cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of
law is made applicable to the second case"); Susan Etta Keller, The Rhetoric of Marriage,
Achievement, and Power: An Analysis ofJudicial Opinions Considering the Treatment of Professional
Degrees as Marital Property, 21 VT. L. REV. 409, 411 (1996) (noting that courts decide cases by
"extrapolat[ing] the facts at hand into a more universal pattern, connecting the precedent
they will set to the precedent they follow"). This norm predominates even outside the
confines of binding precedent within hierarchical court systems, as evidenced by the many
cases in which courts of one jurisdiction rely on and address decisions from other jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., Ortega v. City of New York, 876 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (N.Y. 2007) (citing Tem-
ple Cmty. Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 976 P.2d 223, 232 (Cal. 1999), in which the California
Supreme Court declined to recognize a tort cause of action for intentional third-party
spoliation of evidence); State v. Lackey, 110 P.3d 512, 515 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
State v. Wixom, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Idaho 1997), and State v. Richcreek, 930 P.2d 1304,
1308 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), as cases in which the Idaho Supreme Court and the Arizona
Supreme Court, respectively, concluded on "similar facts" that police officers lacked rea-
sonable suspicion to stop defendants). Of course, this norm does not mean that judge-
made law is entirely consistent. Different judges may read precedent differently or view
facts differently, thereby reaching different decisions in similar cases. SeeJohn Burritt Mc-
Arthur, The Clas Action Tool in Oilfield Litigation, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 113, 148 (1996) ("Even
though there is little disagreement over general [class] certification standards, the same
facts can lead to different results in different courts."). Sometimes judges simply disagree
and decline to follow each other's decisions. See, e.g., Phila. Marine Trade Ass'n-Int'l Long-
shoremen's Ass'n Pension Fund v. Comm'r, 523 F.3d 140, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2008) (explicitly
disagreeing with, and declining to follow, Deutsch v. Comm'r, 599 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1979),
and Miller v. United States, 784 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)). Nevertheless, the
role of precedent-based reasoning in judicial decision making undeniably exerts an overall
force that favors coherence.
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among its own set of competing interests exerting pressures on the
legislators.3 6 Legislators act in response to those pressures and by con-
trast face relatively little pressure to conform their decisions to prior
patterns, except perhaps to some minimal extent necessary to avoid
direct conflicts among or within statutes that would render a statute
unworkable . 7
These three factors are reasons why coherence, despite its advan-
tages, may not be achievable for certain areas of law. In addition,
there may be reasons why we would not prefer coherence. Coherence
also has its disadvantages.
First and most important, seeking coherence can lead to impos-
ing a framework that creates an appearance of coherence where co-
herence does not in fact exist.38 An organizational framework that
36 See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 67-124 (discussing the political history of the
major federal environmental statutes).
37 Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1408
(1988) (attributing to political scientist John Kingdon the argument that "Congress is an
'organized anarchy' whose deliberations are best characterized by the theory of 'garbage
can decisionmaking."' (quotingJ. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES
47-73 (1984))). Areas of the law governed primarily by detailed administrative regulations
may fall somewhere between judge-made law and statutory law. Agencies are, like legisla-
tures, primarily political institutions. Like statutes, regulations are promulgated and re-
vised in different lawmaking moments, in different contexts that result in different
compromises among different competing interests. Moreover, because regulations derive
from statutes, which may treat similar situations quite differently, differences among stat-
utes may require agencies to enact regulations that approach similar problems differently
under different statutes. Administrative regulations are almost inevitably more complex
than legislation, and complexity is associated with incoherence. Cf Peter H. Schuck, Legal
Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (1992) (arguing that, as
compared with legislation, the delegation of discretion to agencies tends to result in legal
rules that are more complex). Complexity is not necessarily congruent with incoherence,
but the two characteristics are at least closely correlated.
Other factors, however, may give agencies incentives to adopt consistent approaches
in their regulations. Institutional or professional norms that transcend particular statutes
may lead agencies to take similar approaches to disparate statutory situations, thereby in-
creasing coherence. Because many of its statutes involve some form of evaluating risks to
public health and the environment, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency
has adopted guidance documents that prescribe a process for assessing carcinogenic risks
that applies throughout the agency's activities. See Notice of Availability of the Document
Entitled Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,765, 17,768-69 (Apr.
7, 2005). Moreover, the standards by which courts review agency rules encourage consis-
tency among agency decisions. See, e.g., Westar Energy, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 473 F.3d 1239, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("A fundamental norm of administrative
procedure requires an agency to treat like cases alike."); Hall v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868,
872 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Reasoned decisionmaking requires treating like cases alike; an
agency may not casually ignore its own past decisions." (footnote omitted)). In fact, how-
ever, most agency rules are more a product of political negotiations among competing
interest groups than a reasoned attempt to create a coherent body of law.
38 See, e.g., Berring, supra note 24, at 15-16 (noting that William Blacktone's Commen-
taries "struggled to place the common law of England into a rational narrative structure"
but that Blackstone "has been roundly excoriated by later critics for bending the data to fit
his needs"); cf. Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the Global
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prioritizes coherence may do so at the cost of imprecisely and inaccu-
rately characterizing the field by ignoring complexity and variation.
Because the law and lawmaking processes are often complicated and
messy, as they are forged by numerous decision makers acting in di-
verse contexts, areas of law seldom live up to the ideal of coherence. 39
Thinking of a body of law as a coherent legal field worthy of particu-
larized study is analogous to putting on blinders and filters: blinders
to obscure situations that lie outside of the field, and filters to obscure
those aspects of situations that arise within the field but that are not
focused on by the analytical framework that characterizes the field.
For better and worse, that framework defines the "universe of thinka-
ble thoughts" as to the category of materials it encompasses.40 Fields
of law focus attention on particular aspects of the law only by inten-
tionally obscuring other aspects. 41 The quest for coherence thus is
prone to breeding essentialism and reductionism. 42 For example, cor-
rective-justice accounts of tort law, by virtue of their focus on bipolar-
ity-the relationship between the tortfeasor and the victim that
obligates the tortfeasor directly to rectify the victim's injury-neglect
various tort rules that do not reflect bipolarity.43 Applying a reduc-
Restitution Party, 28 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 99, 107 (2008) (noting the legal-realist view that
"coherent classification of legal categories is all but impossible" because "[e]ach instance
of adjudication presents a localized act of balancing the competing interests that the legal
system can neither fully realize nor reconcile" (footnote omitted)).
39 See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHi. L. REv. 511, 516 (2004) ("Tasks are said to be complex when their
constitutive considerations are numerous, contradictory, ambiguous, and incommensu-
rate. Most legal cases that are litigated and appealed are of this nature, in that the facts
can be ambiguous, incomplete, and contradictory; different rules, values, and principles
can be invoked to support opposite conclusions; and the case at hand can be somewhat
analogous to more than one previous decision." (footnotes omitted)).
40 Daniel Dabney coined the phrase "universe of thinkable thoughts" to describe the
way in which "categories for classifying the law ... become the structure of the law," and
"thoughts that aren't represented in the system ... become unthinkable." Daniel Dabney,
The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts: Literay Warrant and West's Key Number System, 99 L. LiBR. J.
229, 229-30 (2007); see also id. at 236 ("The essence of a classification scheme is to be a
closed list of the salient ideas in the literature it serves, and when the system, by omitting
an idea, implies that the idea is not sufficiently salient to be included, it can be an obstacle
to considering the idea."). The phrase is probably more associated with Robert Berring,
who agrees that Dabney originated the term. See, e.g., Berring, supra note 12, at 311 n.13.
41 Cf BowiER & STR, supra note 12, at 5 ("[E]ach category valorizes some point of
view and silences another."); id. at 44 (noting that the act of creating a classification neces-
sarily entails "deciding what will be visible or invisible within the system"); Dabney, supra
note 40, at 233 (noting that a classification necessarily implies "that some aspects of the
situation are more important than others").
42 See Ruger, supra note 22, at 629-30 (noting that the classical field-coherence para-
digm "favors frames of analysis that are powerfully reductionist in character, and which
purport to explain a vast array of legal materials with the use of one or a few core concep-
tual building blocks").
43 See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695,
709-33 (2003).
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tionist framework to achieve coherence necessarily oversimplifies the
law, disregarding outcomes that do not match the coherent ideal.44
Thus, as organizational frameworks yield to coherence anxiety, they
lose some of their descriptive force.
Second, chasing coherence discourages experimentation in law-
making. Permitting a diversity of legal approaches allows lawmaking
institutions to test various alternative approaches to a particular prob-
lem, seeing what works and what does not.45 When we demand coher-
ence, we may stifle choice. Coherent accounts of the law can become
deterministic, helping to perpetuate the patterns they identify by ob-
scuring and discouraging opportunities to depart from those identi-
fied patterns. If, for example, we identify torts in terms of optimal
deterrence through utility balancing, 46 we may lose sight of the field's
corrective-justice aspects. 47
Third, attempting to create coherence through internal logic in
the law may well be ineffectual. Incoherence arises from a lack of
consensus about how to approach a legal problem. As long as a con-
sensus is lacking, lawmaking institutions are unlikely to be able to
force coherence but instead may merely push incoherence into other
areas.48 For example, if substantive doctrine within a field were to
favor an outcome on which there was no consensus, this would create
pressure on other areas of legal doctrine-such as justiciability, proce-
dure, and remedies-to counterbalance that effect in order to reflect
the diversity of preferences as to the proper outcome.49
44 See Feinman, supra note 15, at 691-92 (noting that, because classifications necessa-
rily emphasize some features and deemphasize others, doctrinal classification leads to
"framing bias," which occurs when the classification oversimplifies differences among cases
within a category); cf Simon, supra note 39, at 513 (explaining "coherence-based reason-
ing," a theory of cognitive psychology, which "posits that the mind shuns cognitively com-
plex and difficult decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones").
45 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRIsIs AND REFORM 163 (1985) (as-
serting the benefits of allowing "diversity and competition" among federal circuit courts);
Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98
YALE L.J. 679, 743 (1989) (noting that, when the Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve
a conflict among the federal circuits, it "benefit[s] from being able to observe the effects of
the different legal regimes"); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive
Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
761, 785-86 (1983) ("If two circuits or two states are in conflict on a question, other cir-
cuits or other states benefit from the clash of views-the (literally) competing alternatives.
The circuits as well as the states are laboratories for social, including judicial,
experimentation ....").
46 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-95 (1965).
47 See Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for
Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2350-51 (1990).
48 See Schuck, supra note 37, at 29.
49 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-and Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REv. 633, 637 (2006).
2010]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The drawbacks of allowing some incoherence in a field, moreo-
ver, can easily be overstated. The inability to be reduced to a few fun-
damental principles "does not mean that [a field] lacks essential, or
special, attributes worthy of study; nor does it mean that the field lacks
an identifiable structure and architecture. ' '50 Indeed, incoherence is
itself worthy of study. Attempting to determine why the law treats ap-
parently similar situations differently is an important endeavor in un-
derstanding the law. Only by grouping materials together in a field
does incoherence become identifiable and susceptible to studied
examination. 51
In sum, to function as a legal field, an area of law must exhibit
some minimum degree of coherence that legitimates it as an object of
particularized study.52 But coherence has drawbacks and pitfalls as
well as benefits. Accordingly, we should maintain ambivalence about
prioritizing coherence in legal taxonomy and should stay cognizant of
what a classification conceals as well as what it reveals.
C. Threshold Methodological Decisions
Choosing an organizing framework for a legal field requires cer-
tain threshold methodological decisions.53  We must define the
field-that is, identify the scope of situations we want the field to en-
compass. We must choose those aspects of the field on which we want
to focus. A field of law can be understood as arising through the in-
teraction of four underlying constitutive dimensions: factual context,
policy trade-offs, values and interests, and legal doctrine. An organiza-
tional framework for a legal field can apply to any one or a combina-
tion of these constitutive dimensions. Finally, we must decide whether
to employ a descriptive or prescriptive organizational framework.
How we resolve these threshold decisions depends in part on the char-
acteristics of the field and in part on our own methodological inclina-
tion or objectives.
50 Ruger, supra note 22, at 627; see also Elhauge, supra note 1, at 367 (contending that
a field of law does not require agreement about the contours, principles, or policy goals of
the field); Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41
WAKE FoREST L. REv. 347, 356 (2006) ("All the pieces do not need to fit into a tidy whole
for [an area] to be regarded as a legitimate intellectual field, nor does [an area] have to be
organized by theory or overarching principle."); Ruger, supra note 22, at 627 ("To say that
[a field] is messy is not the same as saying it is random; to say it is multifaceted and difficult
to center on a parsimonious internal core is not the same as saying it defies all abstraction
and generalization."); Silberman, supra note 12, at 1429 (arguing that "a 'field' is not nec-
essarily in need of a 'big think' unifying theory").
51 See Ruger, supra note 22, at 646-47 (noting that legal differences within a field
facilitate comparative analysis).
52 See Silberman, supra note 12, at 1429 (arguing that an area of law "merits autono-
mous treatment" if it functions as "an interconnected whole").
53 Indeed, even if we did not make such decisions deliberately, adopting an organiza-
tional framework for a field implicitly would decide certain threshold questions.
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1. Defining the Field
Considering self-consciously how to think about an area of law as
a legal field requires us first to define the category we want to encom-
pass with our analysis. If we are going to construct an organizational
framework by which to analyze a legal field, we will must start with
some understanding of what we think falls within the category of situa-
tions that comprise that field. Defining the field thus differs from co-
hering the field with an organizational framework, but definition is
the first step toward a framework. 5 4
The objective in delineating a legal category should be to find a
definition that is "sufficiently tailored and determinate to provide a
comprehensible description of the instances that fall within [the cate-
gory] .55 A good definition should yield a coherent concept or con-
cepts.5 6 Moreover, the concepts embodied in the definition must
reflect the concepts that are analytically helpful in understanding the
field. 57 Thus, the initial task of defining the field is inherently and
inextricably intertwined with the subsequent task of constructing a
common organizational framework with which to unify the field. Al-
though we cannot begin our analysis without defining the field that
will form the object of our analysis, as we analyze the field and come
to understand it better, we may need to revisit our initial definition,
excluding situations that were included or including situations that
initially were excluded.58
There are numerous ways to define a legal field. A legal field can
be defined on the basis of, among other things, a substantive topic
(for example, environmental law, labor law, tort law); an aspect of the
legal process (for example, statutory interpretation, civil procedure,
criminal procedure, remedies); an institutional actor (for example,
54 One could classify the law into categories based solely on the definitions of the
categories without applying an organizational framework beyond the mere definitions.
But such an approach would untether the categories from their function (and therefore
their rationale). It is the organizational framework for each field that identifies the analyti-
cal significance of the field as a category-that is, the rationale for the usefulness of the
field as a classification.
55 Sherwin, supra note 13, at 110.
56 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1096 (2002)
("Most often, theorists assess a conception by determining whether it is coherent-that is,
whether it is logical and consistent.").
57 The task of identifying the concepts that are analytically helpful in understanding
the field is addressed infra in Part I.C.2.
58 Cf Mark P. Gergen, A Thoroughly Modern Theory of Restitution, 84 TEX. L. REv. 173,
174 n.8 (2005) (book review) (contending that to make restitution a coherent field, Peter
Birks "had to lop off one of its most memorable parts-restitution to reward rescue-and
do some conceptual legerdemain to include some of its most important parts, such as the
right of a joint tortfeasor who satisfies a claim to contribution from another joint
tortfeasor" (citing PETER BuRks, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 170-71 (2d ed. 2005))).
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administrative law, federal courts); or a transsubstantive methodologi-
cal approach (for example, law and economics, comparative law).
2. The Dimensions of the Field
After we initially define the field that is the object of our analysis,
we must choose the aspects of the field on which we want to focus our
analysis. In thinking about that choice, it is useful to conceptualize a
legal field as the interaction among four underlying constitutive
dimensions of the field: factual context, policy trade-offs, values and
interests, and legal doctrine. 59 Every area of the law operates within a
factual context, a set of factual characteristics shared in common by situ-
ations that arise within the field.60 These factual characteristics create
certain policy trade-offs, which dictate the range of options available to
lawmaking institutions such as courts, legislatures, executive branch
agencies, and the public. The lawmaking institutions apply values and
interests to choose among the available options dictated by the trade-
offs. Legal doctrine--the law of the field-arises as the product of the
lawmaking institutions' choices among available options-that is, the
application of values and interests to policy trade-offs. The following
figure illustrates the relationship among the underlying constitutive
dimensions-factual context, policy trade-offs, values and interests,
and legal doctrine:
FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL DIAGrAm Or GENERIC LEGAL FIELD
Factual Context -* Policy Trade-offs
-* Legal Doctrine
Values and Interests
The relationship among the underlying constitutive dimensions
of the law is not just unidirectional from factual context to legal doc-
trine; the relationship runs in the opposite direction as well. Because
59 Some aspects of the conceptual model of legal fields developed in this Article do
not apply well to fields of law, such as law and economics, that are organized around
transsubstantive methodological approaches. See infra text accompanying note 99.
60 The extent to which this factual context is exogenous to the legal system varies
considerably from field to field. Personal injuries and property damage exist regardless of
law, and so the factual context of tort law is for the most part exogenous to the legal
system. For other fields, the context is itself a creation of the law. Taxes, for example,
cannot exist independently of the law, and so the factual context of tax law is to a consider-
able extent endogenous to the law. The factual context of fields such as remedies, civil
procedure, and criminal procedure, moreover, are entirely endogenous to the law, in that
the questions they address arise wholly within the law itself. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, How
Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 164 (2008) (noting that the field of
remedies addresses "the question of what to do about a completed or threatened violation
of law").
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the law remains the ultimate object of our analysis, we can limit our
consideration of the constitutive dimensions of a legal field to those
aspects of the dimensions that eventually bear on the form and con-
tent of legal rules.61 Elements of factual context thus matter if, and
only if, they ultimately bear on the values and interests that the deci-
sion-making institution applies to resolve questions within the area. A
factual characteristic is relevant or significant only insofar as it gives
rise to a policy trade-off that matters, and a trade-off matters only if
the decision-making institution cares about it. For example, a trade-
off between making water available for irrigating agriculture or for
sustaining aquatic wildlife is significant only insofar as the decision-
making institution cares to some extent about both agriculture and
aquatic wildlife. Thus, in conceptualizing a field of law, legal taxon-
omy should care about factual characteristics only insofar as they af-
fect legal doctrine by creating policy trade-offs that actually limit legal
choice.62
Because the interplay among the underlying constitutive dimen-
sions produces law, an area of law can be characterized by any or all of
its underlying dimensions. Indeed, the academic literature readily re-
flects analyses that characterize legal fields based on factual context,6 3
policy trade-offs, 64 values and interests, 65 or legal doctrine. 66
61 Cf Sherwin, supra note 13, at 108 ("Any two factual settings are alike and unlike in
an indefinite number of ways, and the only way to determine which similarities and differ-
ences should count is to refer to some purpose or principle that picks out certain of them
as relevant to what is being decided.").
62 See infra note 75 and accompanying text (arguing that the common features that
cohere a field must be legally relevant).
63 Cf Feinman, supra note 15, at 679-80 (defining factual classification, for which
"the factual similarities among the situations governed by the doctrines within the system
provide both the organization and the identifying criteria for the category").
64 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REv. 531, 615 (2005) (presenting a property-law framework that the authors claim "illumi-
nates the tradeoffs involved in the field"); Lawrence 0. Gostin, A Theory and Definition of
Public Health Law, 10J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'V 1, 4, 12 (2007) (noting that "It]he field of
public health law presents complex tradeoffs," including "[a]chieving a just balance be-
tween the powers and duties of the state to defend and advance the public's health and
constitutionally protected rights"); Theodore W. Ruger, The United States Supreme Court and
Health Law: The Year in Review, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHiCS 611, 611 (2005) ("Problems in the
field of health law often force tradeoffs between uniformity and particularity in health care
decision-making.").
65 See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 64, at 12 (identifying "the quintessential values of public
health law-government power and duty, coercion and limits on state power, govern-
ment's partners in the 'public health system,' the population focus, communities and civic
participation, the prevention orientation, and social justice"); Ruger, supra note 22, at 635
(noting that fields could be analyzed by reference to recurring "primary interests," such as
the right to bodily autonomy in health law).
66 See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellec-
tual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174, 183 (2004) ("Antitrust law, IP law, and the general
law of property and contracts are each well-established disciplines and bodies of law....
[W]e believe that general agreement can be found on the broad positive legal frameworks
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Thus, when we attempt to characterize an area of law, we may
focus on just one of these dimensions or on a combination of dimen-
sions. The patterns that cohere an area of law as a legal field may
arise within any of the dimensions. An ideal, complete analytical
model of a legal field would identify interrelated patterns across all of
the dimensions of the field. Depending on the features of the area of
law, however, this ideal may not be possible. If there is not a stable
mix of values and interests that operates in an area, there may not be
a consistent set of policy trade-offs that encompasses decision making.
Or, even if a stable mix of values and interests (and therefore a consis-
tent set of policy trade-offs) exists, if those values and interests are not
balanced consistently, the legal rules may not have enough consis-
tency to yield coherent legal doctrine. In such situations, our account
of an area of law necessarily may be limited to an incomplete model
that addresses only those dimensions of the area that exhibit recogniz-
able patterns. Depending on the objectives of our analysis, this limita-
tion may be fatal to the project, insignificant, or something in
between.
3. Descriptive Versus Prescriptive Taxonomy
In constructing an organizational framework by which to charac-
terize a legal field, we also must keep in mind whether we want to
reflect the area of law from a descriptive (positive) perspective or a
prescriptive (normative) perspective. 67  Descriptive taxonomy at-
tempts to reflect an area of the law as it currently exists or traditionally
has existed, whereas prescriptive taxonomy attempts to reflect how the
taxonomist thinks the law in the area should exist. Descriptive taxon-
omy tends to favor classifications that are based on objective, observa-
ble characteristics. These characteristics may be self-identified or self-
of each field and the core principles that undergird them."); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Colum-
bus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples'Rights of
Self-Determination, 8 ARiz.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 51, 67 (1991) ("Practitioners and students of
United States Federal Indian Law are all intimately familiar with the three core, fundamen-
tal principles in the field from which all Supreme Court Indian law jurisprudence extends:
the Congressional Plenary Power doctrine .... "); see also Larry Reibstein, Leveling the Politi-
cal Field, THE LAw SCHOOL: THE MAGAZINE OF THE NEw YoRK UNIvERsTY SCHOOL OF LAW,
Autumn 2008, at 21 (quoting Owen Fiss questioning whether the founders of the field of
"Law of Democracy" have identified "an 'autonomous set of principles' governing election
law that would properly constitute a law of democracy").
67 Cf Sherwin, supra note 13, at 105-08 (noting that legal taxonomies can classify
either posited legal rules, ideal legal rules, or "semi-ideal rules attributed to legal deci-
sions"). Although here I equate prescriptive with normative, see, for example, James K.
Hammitt, Response, Saving Lives: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Distribution, 157 U. PA. L. REv.
PENNuMBRA 189, 195 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/03-2009/Hammitt.
pdf, a distinction sometimes is drawn between the two, see, for example, Adrian Vermeule,
Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 387, 390 (2008) (distin-
guishing normative "claims about what ends it would be good to adopt" and prescriptive
"claims about the best means to adopt, given stipulated ends").
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evident from the situations themselves, or the taxonomist or other an-
alyst may assign the features to situations. 68 Prescriptive taxonomy
tends to favor classifications that look more to the underlying func-
tions ascribed to such characteristics. 69
In reality, most legal taxonomies to some extent combine descrip-
tive and prescriptive elements.70 Even a prescriptive taxonomy usually
reflects to some extent the content of existing law rather than a purely
theoretical body of perfect law. And even where a taxonomy attempts
to be descriptive, the very process of organizing an area of law based
on some characteristics and not on others often involves a normative
prioritization rather than a purely descriptive choice.71 Then, once
we have adopted an organizing framework, that framework inevitably
affects how we approach problems that arise in the area. Indeed, be-
cause the purpose of taxonomy is to shape the way we understand that
which is being classified, thereby affecting how we analyze and think
about the area, there is inherently a prescriptive aspect to even the
most purely descriptive taxonomy. For example, the conclusion that a
particular situation has been misclassified-for example, as a tort
rather than a contract dispute-often carries with it the consequential
conclusion that the wrong rule or set of rules has been applied to the
situation.7 2 This is true to a greater extent than in the natural sci-
ences, where the taxonomist is much more than just an observer.73 In
the law, the taxonomist is also inherently part of the project to shape
the law as well as to observe and to characterize it.
D. Minimum Requirements
Taking into account the considerations we have addressed, we
can turn now to identifying the characteristics that are required for an
68 See Sherwin, supra note 13, at 105-07.
69 See id. at 106 (noting that, for prescriptive taxonomy, legal categories-as well as
the proposed legal rules themselves-should reflect some "external criterion of legal good-
ness-moral, economic or otherwise").
70 See id. at 111 (" [T] he same scholarly interests ... that lead a taxonomer to attempt
to formulate ideal rules or extrapolate best-they-can-be legal rules . .. will also tend to
attract him ... to a normative framework ....").
71 See, e.g., id. at 121-22 (explaining that even Birks, a firm believer in providing for-
mal descriptive categories, "appear[s] to stray into normative territory").
72 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 18 (citing cases in which classification as a tort or
contract is determinative as to what legal rule applies).
73 See David Luban, What's Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARmozo L. REv. 43,
69 (1996) ("The crucial difference between law and science is that scientific data are mea-
sured physical quantities, not the holdings of other scientists."); Geoffrey Samuel, English
Private Law: Old and New Thinking in the Taxonomy Debate, 24 OxFoI J. LEGAL STUD. 335,
362 (2004) ("Law is a social science rather than a natural science and the object of its
science is very different. One is not categorizing objects that are empirical and on the
whole lend themselves to classification. One is trying to classify objects that are fluid and
whose empirical nature can be perceived only through schemes and paradigms . . ").
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area of law to constitute a useful classification as a legal field. At a
minimum, a legal field must exhibit two characteristics: commonality
and distinctiveness. An organizational framework for a legal field
therefore must focus on identifying a combination of features that, as
a group, are common and distinctive to the field. To the extent that
an organizational framework focuses on features that are not shared
in common within the field and are not distinctive to the field, this
identification process calls into question the validity and usefulness of
the organizational framework and of the legal field itself.
1. Commonality
A field of law must exhibit some degree of commonality, a charac-
teristic or set of characteristics shared in common by the situations
that arise within the area of law that the field encompasses. Common-
alities establish patterns that cohere the field. These commonalities
may arise within any of the different underlying constitutive dimen-
sions of the field: the factual context, the policy trade-offs, the values
and interests, or the legal doctrine.74
Moreover, not just any commonalities count. As to the first two
dimensions-factual context and policy trade-offs-the commonali-
ties must be legally relevant; that is, they must make a difference in
how the law applies. 75 Only when the common characteristics are le-
gally relevant do the materials they encompass appear as an identifi-
able corpus. Otherwise, an area of law appears to be merely an
amorphous amalgamation of portions of other, existing fields. An
area of law unified only by factual commonality-that is, a common
factual characteristic or characteristics that make no difference to the
application of the law-is, like the Law of the Horse, 76 a joke rather
than a legitimate field of legal study because the various laws that gov-
ern activities related to horses have nothing legally important in com-
mon. Indeed, the common element of the horse is legally
irrelevant.77
74 See supra Part I.C.2.
75 See Feinman, supra note 15, at 680 (arguing that the factual characteristics that
define a legal field should be "not arbitrary, but [should] reflect the analytical and instru-
mental aims of the process," such as "principles, policies, or interests" common to the
category); Hall, supra note 50, at 361 (arguing that the defining features of a field of law
must be "central to the analysis or inquiry, rather than . . . simply being an incident of
generic law's subject matter"); Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 74-75 (contending that
whether a factual attribute defines a legitimate field of legal study depends on whether the
attribute is "a legally relevant fact"); see also Silberman, supra note 12, at 1430 (arguing for
the existence of international litigation as a field of law "because international and com-
parative perspectives shape and influence the development of rules").
76 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
77 Usually the commonality is a description of existing law, rather than a purely nor-
mative prescription for how one thinks the law should be. One could imagine, however,
an emerging field in which a theoretical superstructure precedes any common legal doc-
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Commentators have criticized the presumption that a legal con-
cept must be defined by reference to a single definitional set of char-
acteristics.78 These critiques, in turn, call into question whether strict
commonality is necessary for a legal field. Scholars advancing the cri-
tique have challenged the traditional assumption that legal concepts
must be unified by a "core common denominator"-that is, a set of
necessary and sufficient characteristics shared in common that "single
out [the concept] as unique."79 Drawing on the work of Ludwig
Wittgenstein, these scholars argue that some legal concepts are uni-
fied instead by "a common pool of similar characteristics," analogous
to "family resemblances," that forms "a complicated network of simi-
larities overlapping and criss-crossing" that defines the concept.80
This argument suggests that there may be areas of the law that do not
exhibit strict commonality as to all the features in the organizing
framework but nevertheless share enough commonality to cohere the
area as a useful category and legal field.
2. Distinctiveness
However useful in some respects it may be to conceptualize the
law in terms of fields or categories, there are dangers in becoming too
comfortable living within categories. Taxonomy has the capacity to
obscure as well as illuminate. One potential problem with dividing
the law generally into discrete fields is that it may obscure larger prin-
ciples that transcend the particular field.8 1 Classifying the law into
legal fields focuses attention on particular aspects of the law by ob-
scuring other aspects. A framework for thinking about a field or cate-
gory thus necessarily also keeps us from not thinking about the field-
that is, from seeing commonalities across fields or categories.8 2 For
trine. The field of cyberlaw definitely required the existence of cyberspace, but the field
could have preceded the creation of any law of cyberspace by anticipating such law and
setting forth a normative framework for thinking about it. It is more difficult to imagine a
legitimate field of existing law defined by reference to a normative framework that does
not match, at least in significant part, extant legal doctrine. At the very least, such a cir-
cumstance would seem to require defining the field at a sufficient level of generality to
encompass both the existing doctrine and the theoretical alternative.
78 See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, The Concept of White Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theo7y, 8
BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2004); David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 18 n.54 (1992); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 711, 779-99 (1996); Solove, supra note 56, at 1095-99.
79 Solove, supra note 56, at 1095-96.
80 Id. at 1095-98 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Solove, supra note 12, at
485-86 (noting that certain "activities [can] differ significantly yet share many
commonalities").
81 See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 207-08 ("Teaching 100 percent of the cases on
people kicked by horses will not convey the law of torts very well.").
82 Cf Dabney, supra note 40, at 235 (noting that employing a classification that need-
lessly separates cases from each other "has the potential at least to make the law less coher-
ent" by obscuring characteristics that transcend categories in the classification).
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example, an overemphasis on classifying statutory laws into topic ar-
eas-environmental, labor, health care, tax, etc.-may obscure the
importance of transsubstantive tools of statutory interpretation that
predominate over topic-specific interpretive methods. For a legal
field to be legitimate, there must be a good reason to focus on the
particular category; that is, there must be some reason not to look to
some broader set of materials.
Distinctiveness-the idea that some features of a field are distinct
to that field and not present in other fields-provides just such ajusti-
fication. Thus, an area of law unified by a common, legally relevant
feature (pattern) is not a legal field unless the organizing feature is
distinctive to the area.83 Distinctiveness can arise directly from unique
features of the field or from the unique interplay of otherwise
nonunique features. 84
Distinctiveness in legal doctrine may mean that the field is gov-
erned by unique legal rules that apply only within the field (field excep-
tionalism). Alternatively it may mean that, although unique rules do
not govern the field, the application of general rules results in out-
comes that are unique to the field. This may be because the field
provides a factually unique context that affects the application of par-
ticular rules or because the field's context results in a unique interplay
of rules.
The individual features comprising the organizational framework
that coheres a field need not necessarily each be distinctive to the
field. Rather, the defining features as a set must be distinctive. For
example, some features are common to both labor law and contract
83 Although they have articulated the criterion in different ways, several scholars have
identified some form of distinctiveness as a requirement for a legitimate legal field. See,
e.g., W. Burlette Carter, Introduction: What Makes a "Field" a Field, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 235,
244 (1999) (contending that "a field becomes a field" when "we shape it as such, defining
the concepts and legal norms that will prevail uniquely in that context" and the field
thereby receives "some special treatment . . . in the law"); Elhauge, supra note 1, at 369
("[D]oes the purported field address the legal treatment of a distinct set of relations?");
Hall, supra note 50, at 357-58 ("For a body of substantive law to emerge as a distinctive
field of intellectual inquiry, it must be more than just an assortment of rules that results
from applying other bodies of substantive law to a particular economic sector or human
activity. Such a field is not intellectually distinctive unless there are one or more attributes
of the economic or social enterprise in question that make it uniquely important or diffi-
cult in the legal domain."); Peter W. Hohenhaus, An Introductoy Perspective on Computer
Law: Is It, Should It Be, and How Do We Best Develop It as, a Separate Discipline?, Apr. 1991, at
§ D, 1991 WL 330761 ("The subject matter of the proposed discipline and its legal ramifi-
cations should not comfortably or effectively fit within existing legal frameworks .... ");
Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 76 ("[A] new field of legal study is justified when a
discrete factual setting generates the need for distinctive legal solutions. This distinctive-
ness may manifest itself in the creation of a unique set of legal rules or legal practices, in
the unique expression or interaction of more generally applicable legal rules, or in unique
insights about law." (footnotes omitted)).
84 See Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 85.
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law-after all, the employer-employee relationship is fundamentally
contractual-but that does not mean that labor and contract law are
not each separate, legitimate legal fields.
Moreover, distinctiveness does not necessarily equate with uni-
queness. Just as strict commonality may be unnecessary, 85 strict uni-
queness also may be unnecessary. A legal field may exist where the
field's set of defining features is unified by sufficient similarity and
distinctiveness-even if not perfect uniqueness-to merit unified
consideration.86
E. Additional Attribute: Transcendence
In addition to commonality and distinctiveness, Frank Easter-
brook has argued that fields of legal study also should have transsub-
stantive implications-that is, that legal fields should "illuminate the
entire law" and teach "general rules."8 7 Easterbrook expressed this
position specifically as an objection to the existence of cyberlaw as a
legal field.88 In response to Easterbrook's argument, Lawrence Lessig
defended the study of cyberlaw as a legal field by arguing that the
application of law to cyberspace has yielded insights that are both dis-
tinctive and transcendent. 89 On the one hand, the distinctive features
of cyberspace as a context for the application of law yield unique in-
sights: "We see something when we think about the regulation of
cyberspace that other areas would not show us."90 On the other hand,
these insights are not limited to cyberlaw: they illustrate "general con-
cerns, not particular [ones]" and illuminate "lessons for law gener-
ally." 91 Together, Lessig argues, this combination of distinctiveness
and transcendence "suggest[s] a reason to study cyberspace law for
reasons beyond the particulars of cyberspace." 92 Easterbrook's and
Lessig's comments on the benefits of transcendence highlight an ad-
85 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
86 Cf Feinman, supra note 15, at 699 ("The elements of different paradigms overlap,
but there is considerable redundancy among the elements of a particular paradigm; that is,
most of the elements of a paradigm are more highly correlated with elements of the same
paradigm than with elements of other paradigms.").
87 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 207. Although Easterbrook expressed a preference
for principles that apply to "the entire law," perhaps stemming from his allegiance to a
transsubstantive law-and-economics framework, he seemed to recognize that at least some
of the general or unifying principles he sought to illuminate may apply only in certain
categories of cases. See, e.g., id. at 208 (noting "broader rules about commercial endeav-
ors"). His inclination, however, was clearly toward drawing the most expansive categories
possible.
88 E.g., id. at 208 (arguing that, instead of developing a law of cyberspace, we should
"[d]evelop a sound law of intellectual property, then apply it to computer networks").
89 Lessig, supra note 1, at 502-03.
90 Id. at 502.
91 Id. at 503.
92 Id.
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ditional, potentially important characteristic of a legal field: a tran-
scendence that justifies studying the field in order to understand
better the law in general.93
Having identified distinctiveness as a requisite for the validity of a
legal field, it may seem odd to look for transcendence. Distinctiveness
and transcendence may seem mutually exclusive, or at least opposi-
tional, but in fact their relationship is more complicated. The distinc-
tiveness of the field, some special combination of factors, may be what
causes the field to illuminate transcendent insights. Observing how
the presence of a factual characteristic that is unique to the field af-
fects the development of legal doctrine within the field may offer im-
portant insights into how the absence of the factual characteristic in
other fields affects the development of legal doctrine in those fields.
For example, many similarities exist between the factual contexts
of occupational-safety-and-health law and environmental law. In many
cases, both areas are concerned with the same types of health hazards
posed by the same types of substances. 94 A crucial difference, how-
ever, is the important role of the employer-employee contractual rela-
tionship in occupational-safety-and-health law, a factual element for
which there is no analogue in most environmental-law cases. Analyz-
ing how the employer-employee contractual relationship affects occu-
pational safety and health law may well yield insights into how the
absence of an analogous contractual relationship between polluters
and the public affects, or should affect, the content of environmental
law.
Unlike commonality and distinctiveness, transcendence is not
necessary to legitimate a field of legal study.95 If, for example, study-
ing environmental law helps us to understand environmental law, this
fact suffices to justify the study of environmental law, even if studying
environmental law does not also help us to understand law that is not
9- See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REv. 517, 541-45 (1994) (praising academic authors who "undertake
tax-specific work that generates insights into the process of statutory construction gener-
ally" (footnote omitted) (citing Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations
of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. Rav. 623, 626-27 (1986), and Michael Livingston,
Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of fax Statutes, 69
TEX. L. Rav. 819 (1991))).
94 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (2008) (regulating occupational exposure to mer-
cury in air); 40 C.F.R. § 61.50-.56 (2008) (regulating environmental emissions of mercury
into air).
95 See Greely, supra note 1, at 405-06 ("[M]any time-honored law school subjects and
legal fields are ... courses and fields about the law as it is applied in specific settings, not
about generalized law .... [A]lthough health law provides some insights that may be
useful in other areas of the law, . . . that is not crucial to its importance.").
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environmental. 96 Regardless of whether the transcendence criterion
is necessary, however, it is clearly an additional benefit that enhances
the value of studying the field. 97
F. Caveats and Clarifications
Having thus proposed an approach to the characterization of a
legal field though the development of an organizational framework,
several caveats and clarifications are in order.
First, the approach set forth in this Article intentionally focuses
on the substance of the law, rather than on the processes that produce
and apply substantive law. Most conspicuously, I have omitted any at-
tempt to address questions of which institutions and regulatory tools
are employed or should be employed in making and implementing
law. I have also declined to analyze how choices among institutions
and regulatory tools affect the substance of the law. For example,
there may be systematic differences among legal rules produced
through common-law adjudication, legal rules enacted by legislatures,
and legal rules promulgated by administrative agencies. Such ques-
tions are undoubtedly of fundamental importance, and by excluding
them I do not mean to suggest that they can be ignored. Indeed, they
cannot be completely severed from questions about the substance of
the law. 98 It is both possible and helpful, however, sometimes to think
about substantive law separate from these considerations. A substan-
tive framework, in turn, can provide a means of evaluating alternative
institutional arrangements and regulatory tools.
Second, some aspects of the conceptual model of legal fields de-
veloped in this Part do not apply well to fields of law, such as law and
economics, that are organized around transsubstantive methodologi-
cal approaches. 9 9 Such methodological fields, because they are
transsubstantive, have no particular corpus of law to which they apply
and therefore have none of the underlying constitutive dimensions I
96 Indeed, Lessig accepts Easterbrook's challenge to satisfy his transcendence test
without conceding that cyberspace must satisfy the test to achieve legitimacy. See Lessig,
supra note 1, at 502-03.
97 Jay Feinman has expressed concern that the pursuit of transcendence may succeed
too well, yielding "a metaprinciple that threatens to dissipate [the particular field's] integ-
rity as an independent subject and render it a mere application of some transcendent
method of analysis." Feinman, supra note 15, at 671. Feinman's point is analogous to the
aforementioned concern that the excessive pursuit of coherence may lead us to overlook
meaningful variations in the law. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
98 See Michael Lockwood, Humans Valuing Nature: Synthesizing Insights from Philosophy,
Psychology and Economics, 8 ENVTL. VALUES 381, 395-96 (1999) (noting that institutional
context influences how values are expressed).
99 See supra text following note 58 (noting that legal fields can be organized on the
basis of, among other things, a substantive topic, an aspect of the legal process, an institu-
tional actor, or a transsubstantive methodological approach (for example, law and eco-
nomics or comparative law)).
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have identified here. As a result, methodological fields cannot be uni-
fied by an organizational framework based on patterns in the underly-
ing constitutive dimensions of a particular area of law. Instead,
methodological fields are unified by a common yet distinctive meth-
odological approach to analyzing legal situations generally. 10 0 The
transsubstantive methodology that defines the field also provides the
organizational framework that coheres it. The methodology, and not
underlying constitutive dimensions, must exhibit the minimum char-
acteristics of commonality and distinctiveness. By virtue of their
transsubstantiveness, methodological fields also necessarily exhibit
transcendence. Methodological fields differ analytically in these ways
from other types of legal fields and do not present the same organiza-
tional challenges to coherence that arise within other fields. On the
other hand, methodological fields may raise other organizational chal-
lenges, such as that of determining which specific methodologies fall
within a particular methodological field.
Third, the usefulness of a field-its power to explain a set of situ-
ations-does not depend merely on whether the field meets mini-
mum standards of commonality and distinctiveness. Even among
fields that exhibit a high degree of commonality and distinctiveness,
there still may be tremendous variation in the strength of organization
of a field, as measured by the explanatory power of the field's organi-
zational framework. 1° 1 We have seen above that a framework's ex-
planatory power depends on several factors, including the extent to
which the pattern predominates within the field.10 2 Now we have ad-
ded the additional observation that a field's organizational framework
must focus on the field's common and distinctive features. Integrat-
ing these two ideas yields the proposition that a framework's explana-
tory power depends in part on the extent to which common and
distinctive features (which are part of the framework) predominate
within the field over other features (which are not part of the frame-
work). In other words, the question becomes: of the situations that
arise within the field, to what extent are those situations captured by
the organizing features of the field, as opposed to other features of
the individual case or subcategory of cases that are either not shared
100 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349, 353-55
(1984) ("Every article in law and economics adheres, explicitly or implicitly, to one or
more of four logically distinct theses: Economic theory provides a good theory for predict-
ing how people will behave under rules of law (the behavioral claim).... The law ought to
be efficient (the normative claim) .... The (common) law is in fact efficient (the positive
claim).... The common law tends to select efficient rules, although not every rule will, at
any given time, be efficient (the genetic claim)." (emphasis omitted)).
101 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Where Is the "There" in Health Law? Can It
Become a Coherent Field?, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 101, 103 (2004) (arguing that "[m]edical law
deals with medical activities in too many settings" to yield a "grand organizing principle").
102 See supra text following note 20.
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in common in the field or not distinctive to the field? Thus, one
might posit that a very broad legal field, such as public law, might
have so much variety that its common and distinctive organizing
framework offers only a rather weak understanding of any particular
problem or case that arises within the field. 10 3 The more that the
common and distinctive features predominate, the more coherent the
field and the more powerful the framework that defines the field in
terms of those features will be as a tool for understanding the corpus
of law encompassed by the field.10 4
Fourth, for any particular field, there may be multiple alternative
frameworks that organize the field in a useful way. Frameworks can
focus on different dimensions of a field, or on combinations of
dimensions. Frameworks can be articulated at varying degrees of gen-
erality or abstraction. In some cases, one framework may be clearly
superior to another in its ability to explain a field. In other cases,
however, one analytical framework will be more useful for some analy-
ses, and another will prove more useful for other tasks. 105
Fifth, although an area of law must exhibit commonality and dis-
tinctiveness to be a legal field, in some cases there may be benefits to
other categorizations of the law that do not meet these requirements.
Even legal areas organized only on the basis of factual commonality
may still have some utility for some purposes. Law firms, for example,
may form practice groups to market themselves to a particular indus-
try-for example, a chemical practice group staffed with lawyers famil-
iar with the technical aspects and legal requirements of the chemical
industry.10 6 Law schools may teach classes addressing subject matters
that attract particularly strong student interest and then use the
course to illustrate cross-cutting legal issues, rather than teach a par-
103 But cf Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitu-
tional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1791, 1865 (2009) (arguing that "constitutional
and international law, proceeding along parallel tracks, have dealt with a common set of
practical and theoretical problems.., with similar analytic tools, and they have converged
on a remarkably similar range of solutions" and expressing the hope that "the commonali-
ties of their respective enterprises will produce intellectual synergies" and thereby "shed
new light on public law as a field of academic inquiry").
104 Cf Hall & Schneider, supra note 101, at 103 (criticizing existing health-law doctrine
for "draw[ing] its doctrines from the many fields of law that govern ordinary commercial
affairs," without considering whether the distinctive context of health law sometimes sup-
ports a different legal rule).
105 See Mattei, supra note 12, at 8 ("[N]o taxonomy can claim universality by serving
every... purpose better than every alternative one.").
106 See, e.g., Christensen O'ConnorJohnson Kindness PLLC, Chemical Practice Group,
http://www.cojk.com/ourpractice/chemicalprocesspatents.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2009); McAndrews, Held & Malloy, Ltd., Chemical Practice Group, http://www.mhmlaw.
com/brochure/chemical.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
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ticular subject matter as a distinct corpus of law. 10 7 Such classifica-
tions may be useful for their limited purposes despite the lack of a
distinctive and coherent body of law required for a true legal field.
As Douglas Laycock's history of remedies as a legal field suggests,
the organization and specialization of legal practice influences the de-
velopment and recognition of legal fields.'08 If lawyers do not organ-
ize themselves or specialize in terms of a particular category, they
create a substantial impediment to the development of that category
as a legal field, even if the category has all the attributes of a legitimate
field. Laycock makes this point with respect to the field of remedies:
because practitioners do not specialize in remedies, the task of devel-
oping the field fell entirely on legal academics. 109 If, on the other
hand, lawyers organize their practice by reference to a category, they
highlight the category as a potential field and also create a demand
for other correlates of a legal field, such as practice materials, confer-
ences, academic research, and law school courses. Together, these
factors are likely to spur the development and recognition of the cate-
gory as a legal field.
Sixth, although the construction of a legal field may sound like a
rather orderly and logically rigorous process in which the scope of a
legal field and its internal organizing features appear clear, distinct,
and well defined, the law often is not so simple. Any particular situa-
tion may implicate and benefit from multiple conceptual frameworks,
whether the situation can be helpfully considered as arising within
different fields or whether the situation can be helpfully considered
from multiple different organizing frameworks even within a particu-
lar field, or both. 110 This complexity is not necessarily a problem;
107 See Carter, supra note 83, at 243-44 (arguing that there is a "need for a law school
curriculum that provides opportunities for integration" of multiple legal fields and identi-
fying sports law as a "bridge course[ ]" that could help meet this need).
108 See Laycock, supra note 60, at 167-68.
109 See id.
110 Some private-law theorists have posited that, under a proper taxonomic system,
legal categories can be arranged in a hierarchy under which categories at the same level of
generality do not overlap. See, e.g., Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment,
79 TEX. L. REv. 1767, 1781 (2001) ("The test of the validity of a taxonomy is precisely the
question of whether any item within its purview can appear in more than one category
purportedly pitched at the same level of generality."); see also Feinman, supra note 15, at
664 ("Every categorization implies a choice between categories, a decision that the case
belongs in one place rather than another."). However ill- or well-advised such a rule is in
the private-law context, see Sherwin, supra note 13, at 123 (expressing "doubt[ I" about
Birks's position), for public law, such a rule seems demonstrably wrong. For example,
legal issues often arise within the categories of both environmental law and bankruptcy
law, neither of which is a subcategory of the other. See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (addressing whether federal bankruptcy law
displaces state environmental law); United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1237-39 (11 th
Cir. 2001) (addressing whether a corporate executive's limited authority over operations
due to bankruptcy of the corporation foreclosed holding the executive criminall! liable for
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each of the various organizing frameworks emphasizes particular an-
gles on and insights into the situation. That being said, to the extent
that a situation arises within different fields, each of which may pre-
scribe a different set of legal rules-or at least different understand-
ings of what the situation entails-field overlap does present a
challenge. For example, when the federal government sues the par-
ent corporation of a defunct chemical company for the costs of clean-
ing up industrial waste generated by the defunct company's chemical
plant, should the issue be viewed primarily as a question of environ-
mental law, which would tend to emphasize broad liability to accom-
plish the cleanup of environmental contamination, or corporate law,
which would emphasize the limited liability of a parent corporation
for the actions of its subsidiaries?" Such overlap situations "present
problems for a system of doctrinal classification at the same time that
they offer particularly sharp examples for the delineation of the
processes of doctrinal classification."' 1 2
II
WHY Is ENVIRONMENTAL LAW A LEGAL FIELD?
Having addressed in Part I how we might think generally about a
field of law, Part II focuses on environmental law as a legal field. As
the Introduction to this Article noted, the perception that environ-
mental law is incoherent and lacks a distinctive conceptual core has
given rise to considerable existential angst within the field. 113 There
is, moreover, a sense that courts may not view environmental law as a
distinctive legal field at all.114
Part II begins by examining two noteworthy efforts to cohere en-
vironmental law as a legal field. I argue that neither of these works
satisfactorily conceptualizes environmental law as a legal field; rather,
corporation's environmental violations); see also, e.g., Hayes v. Crown Cent. Petroleum
Corp., 78 Fed. App'x 857, 862-63 (4th Cir. 2003) (addressing whether proxy solicitation
violated the Securities Exchange Act by not disclosing the favorable impact that would
result if a corporation settled a labor dispute, a question potentially falling within the fields
of both labor law and securities law).
1II See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 70 (1998) (stating that the issue was one
in which corporate-law principles should apply and chastising the district court for failing
to apply corporate-law standards).
112 Feinman, supra note 15, at 667-68.
113 See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
114 See Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in the Supreme
Court, 17 PACE ENVrL. L. REv. 1, 14 (1999) ("For most of the Court, most of the time,
environmental law has become no more than a subspecies of administrative law, raising no
special issues or concerns worthy of distinct treatment as a substantive area of law. Envi-
ronmental protection is merely an incidental context for resolution of a legal question.");
see alsoJay D. Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 260,
262 (2006) ("[S]cholars must clarify, with some specificity, what it would mean for courts
to treat environmental law as a distinct area of law.").
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both offer an incomplete account of the field, one that is tied too
closely with environmentalism. The remainder of Part II develops my
proposed framework for understanding environmental law. My
framework identifies two fundamental common and distinct factual
characteristics of environmental problems: physical public resources
and pervasive interrelatedness. Because of the multiplicity of uses that
people make of environmental resources and the pervasive interrelat-
edness of these uses, conflicts among uses arise and are exceedingly
difficult to manage. These use conflicts define the policy trade-offs
that frame environmental lawmaking and form the basis for a use-con-
flict framework to conceptualize environmental law as a legal field.
A. Critique of Prior Approaches
This Section examines and critiques two important efforts to ex-
plain environmental law as a coherent legal field: Dan Tarlock's 2004
article Is There a There There in Environmental Law?'15 and David West-
brook's 1994 article Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence.'1 6 Both arti-
cles offer interesting insights into environmental law, for which they
are often cited in environmental-law scholarship.'1 7 Despite these
contributions, neither Tarlock nor Westbrook achieves his ultimate
objective of explicating a conceptually unified environmental law.
1. Dan Tarlock's Environmental Conceptualism
Tarlock's 2004 article Is There a There There in Environmental
Law?' " 8 is probably the foremost extant work addressing the question
of whether-and why-environmental law is a legal field by attempt-
ing to develop a set of principles for environmental law. For Tarlock,
an august figure in environmental-law scholarship, the project has
very real, practical significance. Although Tarlock acknowledges that
"environmental law is very much embedded in the legal landscape,"
and that "[t] he legal profession never harbored any doubts about the
legitimacy of environmental law," he nevertheless frets over "three re-
115 Tarlock, supra note 11.
116 Westbrook, supra note 5.
117 For examples of works excerpting or citing Tarlock's article, see DANIEL A. FARBER
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4-8 (7th ed. 2006); ROBERT V. PERCI-
VAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 62-63 (5th ed. 2006);
Farber, supra note 4, at 388 & n.36. For examples of works citing Westbrook's article, see
David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 553 n.21 (1997); Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of
Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 897, 908 n.63; Eric W. Orts & Paula C. Mur-
ray, Environmental Disclosure and Evidentiary Privilege, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 40 n.210; Doug-
las A. Kysar, The Consultants' Republic, 121 HARv. L. REV. 2041, 2057 n.41 (2008) (book
review).
118 Tarlock, supra note 11.
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lated but disturbing features of environmental law that make its future
survival problematic":" 19
First, it is, in the span of legal time, an infant area of the law that
may not necessarily live to maturity. Second, its survival is more
problematic than other areas of law because it is not an organic
mutation of the common law, or more generally, the western legal
tradition. Third, as a result of the first two, environmental law re-
mains largely unintegrated into our legal system; thus, it is vulnera-
ble to marginalization as support for environmentalism ebbs and
flows.12 0
Tarlock views environmentalism as "a potentially transforma-
tive . . . paradigm shift" in our culture that will be in danger unless
and until it becomes embedded in "a stable legal regime to reflect this
meta-value transition."' 12 1 The construction of a stable legal regime,
he believes, would make environmental law "real law."' 122 For Tarlock,
"areas of 'real law"' require "a set of distinctive, fundamental princi-
ples [ ] . . . that can be applied to a wide range of current and future
issues."123 These principles would insulate environmental law from
political whims, providing "legal drag on the amplitude of the political
oscillations" and enabling environmental law to achieve "permanence
and acceptance."' 24 Without such principles, environmental law faces
the possibility of "total assimilation and marginalization" in the law
generally.1 25
To meet this perceived need, Tarlock proposes five "candidate
principles" of environmental law:
" "Minimize Uncertainty Before and As You Act"
" "Environmental Degradation Should Be a Last Resort After All
Reasonable, Feasible Alternatives Have Been Exhausted"
* "Risk Can be a Legitimate Interim Basis for Prohibition of an
Activity"
" "Polluters Must Continually Upgrade Waste Reduction and
Processing Technology"
119 Id. at 215-17.
120 Id. at 217.
121 Id. at 218-19. Tarlock offers labor law as an example of a field that has ossified.
Labor law "was once a new and dynamic area of the law, but now suffers from a combina-
ion of legislative and judicial hostility." Id. at 226.
122 Id. at 221-22.
123 Id. at 218; see also id. at 228 ("One of the primary characteristics of a distinct area of
law is that it contains a relatively unique set of core principles distinguishing it from other
areas of the law."); id. at 222-23 (arguing that environmental law compares unfavorably to
iconic fields such as contract, tort, property, and criminal law that exhibit "a pre-existing
set of widely accepted legal doctrines").
124 Id. at 220, 222.
125 Id. at 230.
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* "Environmental Decisionmaking Should Be Inclusive Rather than
Exclusive within the Limits of Rationality"' 26
He envisions these principles as "rebuttable presumptions" to struc-
ture environmental decision-making processes, rather than "hard"
substantive rules.' 2 7 This flexibility is necessary because "the science-
based nature of environmental law precludes the definition of hard
rules and pushes the law toward process rather than consistent
outcome."128
2. David Westbrook's Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence
Like Tarlock, Westbrook, in his 1994 article, Liberal Environmental
Jurisprudence,129 also sets out to organize environmental law into "a co-
herent whole" and thereby establish environmental law as a legitimate
discipline. 13 0 Westbrook contends that environmental law is a strug-
gle to protect environmental values, which transcend individual
human welfare, within a liberal legal system that responds only to im-
pacts on individual humans. 13 1
In support of his thesis, Westbrook classifies environmental law
into three stages, which together "form an idealized history that con-
ceptually organizes the materials of environmental law." 132 In the first
stage, archaic environmental law attempts to address environmental
damage through common-law tort.13 3 Archaic environmental law con-
ceptualizes environmental harms as infringements on individual
rights and seeks to redress those infringements through traditional
common-law mechanisms. 3 4 The second stage, classical environmen-
tal law, addresses environmental problems through bureaucratic regu-
lation. 3 5 Classical environmental law strives for the ideal of an
efficient market.13 6 It views environmental problems as market fail-
ures and intervenes in markets with regulation intended to internalize
the costs of environmental damage. 137 The third stage, modem envi-
ronmental law, addresses environmental problems by attempting to
126 Id at 248-53.
127 Id. at 220.
128 Id. at 239-40.
129 Westbrook, supra note 5.
130 Id. at 621.
131 See id. at 622-23 & n.3.
132 Id. at 621-22.
133 See id. at 631-47.
134 Id. at 680.
135 See id. at 647-62.
136 Id. at 662, 681.
137 See id. at 652; id. at 661 ("By passing regulations, bureaucrats attempt to replace
consumer choice aggregated through the flawed unregulated market with reasoned
guesses about the aggregation of consumer choice in a hypothetical well-functioning
market.").
[Vol. 95:221
2010] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD
construct markets. 138 Market incentives, both positive (entitlements)
or negative (taxes), allow market behavior to achieve environmental
objectives. 139
According to Westbrook, the problem with each of these stages is
that they attempt to use a liberal legal system, premised on the protec-
tion of personal autonomy, to vindicate environmental values that do
not translate well into a liberal framework because they are not lim-
ited to protecting personal autonomy. 140 Thus, " [e] nvironmental law
can be understood as a series of attempts to phrase concern for the
context of human life in a political philosophy grounded on individ-
ual choice."1 41 Because these attempts inevitably will fail, environ-
mental law will be complete only when it steps outside of the liberal
framework and embraces the value of nature qua nature. 42
3. Critique
Both Tarlock's and Westbrook's observations about environmen-
tal law are well taken. Anyone familiar with environmental law will
recognize in Tarlock's five candidate principles some of the recurring
issues in the field.1 43 And Westbrook's account of environmental law
offers important insights into some of the difficulties faced in making
138 See id. at 663-80.
139 See id. at 666-67, 670-73.
140 Id. at 693-94. Westbrook is not the first scholar, of course, to note the difficulty of
protecting environmental values within a legal, social, and economic system that focuses
overwhelmingly on individual human welfare. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource
Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 295-96 (1989) ("As long as government is making
the legal rules and as long as only humans vote, the concerns of nature never will be
reflected directly in our nation's governmental policy. Most environmental laws enacted to
date focus on protecting people's interest in the natural environment."). On the other
hand, the "pervasive connections between human welfare and the surrounding environ-
ment," Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1505, 1549
(2008), mean that almost every environmental impact affects human welfare in some way,
see ZygmuntJ.B. Plater, The Three Economies: An Essay in Honor ofJoseph Sax, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
411, 433 (1998) ("Some marketplace externalities may only affect natural systems, with no
human consequences, but many others pass through the environment into the human
welfare context of civic-societal economics.").
141 Westbrook, supra note 5, at 708; see also id. at 695 ("Environmental law can be un-
derstood as a succession of attempts to square the circle and phrase claims of the external
environment within the internal logic of liberalism."); id. at 701 ("The emergence of illib-
eral values, such as a substantive value in nature, within the context of liberal law is thus
incessantly problematic.").
142 See id. at 709, 711.
143 For example, a recent major Supreme Court environmental case, EnvironmentalDe-
fense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007), involved a dispute between federal regula-
tors and the owner of a coal-fired electricity plant over whether modifications made by the
owner at the plant rendered the plant a new or modified source that, under the Clean Air
Act, must adopt more stringent pollution-control technology, see id. at 570-71. Duke Energy
is a clear example of a case implicating Tarlock's fourth principle, which holds that pol-
luters must continually upgrade waste reduction and processing technology. See Tarlock,
supra note 11, at 252.
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environmental law through systems, institutions, and processes that
are in many ways ill-suited to a full consideration of the natural envi-
ronment. Nevertheless, neither Tarlock nor Westbrook ultimately
meets the goal of cohering environmental law as a legal field.
Both Tarlock and Westbrook focus on conceptualizing environ-
mental law by reference to environmentalist ideals. 144 Although en-
vironmentalism obviously plays an important role in environmental
lawmaking, the centrality of environmentalism to Tarlock's and West-
brook's frameworks is to their arguments' detriment in at least two
respects.
First, to the extent that Tarlock and Westbrook intend their ac-
counts to describe environmental law as it exists,1 45 rather than as it
normatively should exist, their focus on environmentalism renders
their characterization of environmental law incomplete. Environ-
mentalism does not predominate in current environmental law, and
there is little prospect of that changing significantly in the future. In-
stead, environmental law reflects a balance among a variety of compet-
ing values and interests, which include environmentalism but also
other, arguably more powerful, values such as maintaining traditional
patterns of resource exploitation and resistance to government regu-
lation. 46 Indeed, even Tarlock's principles, which he proposes as
tools for advancing environmentalism, implicitly acknowledge that en-
vironmentalism must be balanced against other values and inter-
ests.1 47  It is that balance among competing demands on
144 See Tarlock, supra note 11, at 218 (opining that environmental law should reflect
environmentalism as "a potentially transformative, fundamental, if still semi-coherent and
contested paradigm shift in the ways in which we enjoy the use of our air, water, and soil
planetary life support systems and our biodiversity heritage"); Westbrook, supra note 5, at
711-12 (expressing hope that environmental law will come to reflect "an understanding of
nature").
145 Tarlock is unclear about whether his principles are primarily descriptive or pre-
scriptive. See Tarlock, supra note 11, at 248-49 (describing his candidate principles as "a
mix of how environmental law has evolved and how it should evolve"). Westbrook adopts a
largely descriptive framework, which he employs at the end of his article to make prescrip-
tive arguments. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 621 (identifying his goal of organizing "the
basic materials of environmental law"-"the key statutes, cases, and articles that every envi-
ronmental lawyer knows and every casebook contains"-"into a coherent whole"); id. at
711 (arguing in favor of "[a] vision of nature adequate to inform environmental jurispru-
dence" that "would transform politics").
146 See infta text accompanying note 181.
147 Thus, Tarlock's first principle posits that environmental law should minimize un-
certainty before actions are taken. See Tarlock, supra note 11, at 249. However, this princi-
ple also acknowledges that decisions must be made despite lingering uncertainty. See id, at
249 (acknowledging that some information will be acquired "as you act," after an initial
decision has been made). Tarlock's second principle advocates avoiding environmental
degradation. See id. at 250. He nevertheless acknowledges that "[a] general non-degrada-
tion standard ... is not possible" and that degradation should be allowed "if there are no
acceptable alternatives." Id. Tarlock's third principle asserts that government can regulate
substances or activities based on a risk of an adverse impact without proving that the im-
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environmental resources, more than anything, that defines environ-
mental decision making. Moreover, this balance is a central, inher-
ent, and internal part of environmental law itself, not, as both Tarlock
and Westbrook seem to assume, an external threat to environmental
law. By relegating these countervailing considerations to an ancillary
role in their frameworks and failing to address how to balance among
competing considerations, Tarlock's and Westbrook's accounts of en-
vironmental law lose much of their potential descriptive and prescrip-
tive efficacy.
Second, Tarlock's and Westbrook's invocations of environmental-
ism oversimplify the variety of values and interests that are associated
with environmental protection. Environmental protection means dif-
ferent things in different situations and to different people; in any
given scenario, a diverse range of values and interests may claim to fall
under the general category of environmental protection: tourism, rec-
reation, wildlife habitat, sustainable-resource extraction, absolute
preservation, and a host of others. A particular environmental deci-
sion may implicate various combinations of these values and interests.
These values and interests may conflict. Thus, environmental protec-
tion is not monolithic. By employing the broad category of environ-
mental protection to animate their characterization of environmental
law, Tarlock and Westbrook obscure many of the most vexing trade-
offs facing environmental decision makers.
In addition to tying their frameworks for unifying environmental
law too closely to environmentalism, Tarlock and Westbrook are con-
ceptually underinclusive. Tarlock confines his search for a conceptual
core of environmental law to the content of legal doctrine, not to any
of the other dimensions of environmental law: factual context, policy
trade-offs, and values and interests.1 48 In part, this probably stems
from Tarlock's practical objective of promoting environmental protec-
tion through the application of environmental law.149 To a large ex-
tent, Tarlock cares only about whether environmental law
accomplishes environmental protection and therefore only about the
pact will definitely occur, but only if the government can justify the regulation. Id. at
251-52. Tarlock's fourth principle provides that environmental law should continuously
advance technology. Id. at 252. He would nonetheless have to concede that a source that
very recently upgraded to the best available technology, at great expense, must be ex-
empted at least temporarily from further required upgrades. Tarlock's fifth and final prin-
ciple advocates making decisions inclusive, except when doing so exceeds the limits of
rationality. Id. at 253.
148 See supra Part I.C.2.
149 See Tarlock, supra note 11, at 228 (expressing concern that environmental law "will
lose power in the judicial and political arena"); id. at 254 (expressing hope that environ-
mental law will "evolve into a permanent check on the full range of resource consumption
decisions").
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content of environmental-law doctrine.15 0 To the extent that there is
coherence in environmental law outside of environmental-law doc-
trine, Tarlock may simply not care, at least for the purposes of his
article.
On the other hand, Tarlock does repeatedly invoke the idea that
environmental law can or must be reduced to "a set of distinctive, fun-
damental principles" 151 if it is to be a legitimate legal field or "real
law.' 52 In this respect, he seems to accept the conceptualist assump-
tion that a legal field can only exhibit coherence to the extent that it
can be reduced to a few fundamental principles. Such an approach,
however, neglects coherence arising from other dimensions of a field.
Moreover, whatever the merits of conceptualism 153 as an approach in
other legal fields, 154 it seems poorly matched to environmental law.
As Tarlock's candidate principles themselves reflect by their failure to
address the trade-offs they implicate, environmental law lacks the level
of internal logic and consistency in its legal doctrine that is necessary
to yield conceptualist principles.1 55 The context of environmental law
is too nuanced to yield simple principles. This complexity does not
mean, however, as Tarlock appears to believe, that environmental law
lacks a conceptual core or is not a legal field.156
Nor does Westbrook's "limits of liberalism" theory accomplish his
goal of organizing all of environmental law into "a coherent
whole."'1 57 Merely valuing nature qua nature would not, as Westbrook
asserts, render environmental law "substantively complete" 158 because
the challenges of environmental law are not limited to value balanc-
ing. To the contrary, the distinctive features of environmental re-
sources-and in particular the complex web of pervasive
interrelationships among uses of those resources-make it extremely
difficult to manage the environment regardless of what mix of values
150 See id. at 218-19.
151 Id. at 218.
152 Id. at 218, 221-23, 228.
153 "'Conceptualism' describes legal theories that place a high value on the creation
(or discovery) of a few fundamental principles and concepts at the heart of a system ....
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodox,, 45 U. PiT-r. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1983).
154 Cf. supra Part I.B.
155 See infra Part II.F.
156 It is interesting that Tarlock identifies, as a conceptual "model" for environmental
law, areas of natural-resource law that exhibit coherence based on "the special physical
characteristics of a resource and the social dynamics that shaped the conflicts over the use
of it." Tarlock, supra note 11, at 230. To my mind, Tarlock's subsequent analysis of envi-
ronmental law in his article does not particularly reflect this conceptual model. The ap-
proach to environmental law that I propose in this Article, however, strongly resembles this
conceptual model. See infra Part II.C-H.
157 See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 621.
158 Id. at 711.
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we are trying to vindicate. 159 Thus, not nearly every problem of envi-
ronmental law derives from value balancing, let alone from the partic-
ular difficulties that arise from the limitations of liberalism.
Even as to the specific focus of Westbrook's framework-the in-
ability of liberalism to vindicate environmental values-his account is
incomplete. According to Westbrook, the fundamental failing of lib-
eralism as applied to environmental problems is that liberalism's focus
on protecting personal autonomy prevents it from valuing the envi-
ronment because many environmental values cannot be analyzed in
terms of personal autonomy. 160 But environmentalism is not the only
challenge to liberalism's reliance on personal autonomy. A liberal le-
gal framework premised on personal autonomy arguably fails in virtu-
ally every context because personal autonomy is not a fact but a social
construct that ignores numerous social interdependencies. 161 These
interdependencies include, but are not limited to, environmental in-
terdependence. As such, Westbrook's account fails to justify environ-
mental law as a distinct legal field as opposed to just another set of
instances in which interdependence exposes the fallacy of personal
autonomy on which liberalism is based.
Thus, neither Tarlock nor Westbrook achieves his objective of
finding an organizational framework to cohere environmental law as a
distinctive legal field. I have criticized their explanations of environ-
mental law on several points. Ultimately, however, my deepest disa-
greement with their approaches stems from their failure to identify
what I have argued here are the essential attributes of a legal field:
features that are common throughout the field and features that are
distinctive to the field.' 62 With that critique in mind, we can turn to
my argument for a different framework for understanding environ-
mental law as a legal field.
B. Defining Environmental Law
To consider how we should think about environmental law as a
legal field, we must first have some understanding of what the field of
environmental law might encompass-that is, of the scope of situa-
tions we wish to characterize with our organizational framework. Al-
159 See infra Part II.C.1-3.
160 See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 693-95.
161 See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPEN-
DENCY 20-22, 28-30 (2004) (characterizing autonomy as a "foundational myth[ ]"); Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 78-82; David R. Car-
lin, Jr., The Crusoe Fallacy: Who Is in Charge Here? Me, Me, Me. COMMONWEAL, Feb. 14,
1997, at 7.
162 Cf Hunter, supra note 19, at 20 (criticizing other frameworks proposed for health
law on the ground that they "omit[ ] too much of what constitutes the core of legal regula-
tion of the health care system").
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though everyone has some intuitive sense of the meaning of the term
environmental law, it is not self-defining. Some laws-for example, pol-
lution statutes like the Clean Water Act 63 and Clean Air Act' 64-obvi-
ously fall within the definition. But what about laws regulating natural
resources, such as the statutes governing the management of public
lands?16- These laws reflect a consideration of the need to conserve
and to preserve elements of the natural environment, 166 but they also
intentionally facilitate the exploitation of natural resources, even at
the cost of some environmental degradation. 67 Are such laws envi-
ronmental? What about laws that do not necessarily reflect any con-
sideration of the environment, yet may have significant environmental
effects? Such laws may include, for example, tax subsidies that en-
courage the purchase of sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) with low fuel effi-
ciencies or laws regulating rail-freight rates.' 68 Some statutes that
exhibit an obvious overall orientation toward protecting the environ-
ment nevertheless include specific provisions that do not share this
goal and in fact may be intended to sacrifice environmental protec-
tion to satisfy some other, opposing interest.169 Other statutes do not
exhibit an overall orientation toward protecting the environment but
163 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
164 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401- 7 67 1 q (2006).
165 See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-85
(2006).
166 My use of the term natural environment here is not intended to suggest the existence
of nature entirely independent of human impacts. As several scholars have noted, "[t] here
really is no such thing as nature untainted by people." Peter Kareiva et al., Domesticated
Nature: Shaping Landscapes and Ecosystems for Human Welfare, 316 Sci. 1866, 1866 (2007)
(citing Eric W. Sanderson et al., The Human Footprint and the Last of the Wild, 52 BIOSCIENCE
891 (2002)); see also William Cronon, Introduction: In Search of Nature, in UNCOMMON
GROUND: TOWARD REINVENTING NATURE 23, 25 (William Cronon ed., 1995) ("The work of
literary scholars, anthropologists, cultural historians, and critical theorists over the past
several decades has yielded abundant evidence that 'nature' is not nearly so natural as it
seems.").
167 Compare, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (3) (instructing the Secretary of the Interior, in
the management of public lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management, to
"give priority to the designation and protection of areas of critical environmental con-
cern"), with 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (1) (instructing the Secretary of the Interior, in the man-
agement of the same public lands, to "observe the principles of multiple use and sustained
yield," which are defined in § 1702(c) to include the potential extraction of timber and
minerals).
168 See I.R.C. § 280F(a) (1) (A), (d)(5)(A) (2006) (allowing greater tax deduction for
some sport-utility vehicles than for other cars because the definition of a luxury automo-
bile-subject to limited depreciation deduction-is more stringent for cars than for
SUVs); id. § 4064 (applying an excise tax to domestic sales of cars that do not satisfy fuel-
economy standards but exempting vehicles that weigh more than 6,000 pounds); United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 678,
696-99 (1973) (reviewing environmental group's challenge to Interstate Commerce Com-
mission's approval of rail-freight increases).
169 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 125, 42 U.S.C. § 7425(b) (authorizing rules or orders
prohibiting certain air-pollution sources "from using fuels other than locally or regionally
available coal or coal derivatives").
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nonetheless include specific provisions that do reflect a goal of envi-
ronmental protection.170 Which of these are environmental law and
which are not? To answer that question, we first must decide what we
mean to accomplish by classifying a legal rule as environmental. For
this Article, I am interested in how the legal classification of environ-
mental law illuminates the functioning of the law. 171 In other words,
my focus is on legal rules that are environmental in a way that some-
how affects the substance of the rule or of its application.
A surprising amount of scholarship discusses and theorizes about
environmental law without defining the scope of the term.172 Some
authors, however, have offered definitions, which fall into three main
types. The most expansive definitions include all laws that affect the
physical environment.1 73 Other definitions restrict environmental law
to laws that are enacted for the purpose, or the primary purpose, of
protecting the natural environment.174 The narrowest definitions in-
clude only laws that reflect an environmentalist ethic.' 75
In choosing a useful definition for environmental law, the chal-
lenge is to balance overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. An over-
170 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2378 (2006) (requiring military procurement of copier paper
to contain specified percentages of post-consumer recycled content); Pub. L. No. 106-181,
§ 157, 114 Stat. 61, 89 (2000) (directing the Federal Aviation Administration to study "the
use of recycled materials ... in pavement used for runways, taxiways, and aprons").
171 See infra Part II.A.
172 Cf Wexler, supra note 114, at 283-84 (noting some of the problems with defining
what law is environmental and opining that "sort[ing] these issues out[ ] . .. would be
difficult and time consuming").
173 See Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
63, 64 n.2 (2003) ("I use the term environmental law to describe the vast realm of law,
largely statutory, that addresses human actions affecting the rest of the natural world.");
Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BuFF. ENVTL. L.J. 211,
262 (2002-03) ("Environmental law can be generally defined as the law governing the
relationships of humans to the biophysical environment.").
174 See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
art. 45.2(a), Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1495, available at http://www.cec.org/pubs-
info resources/lawtreatagree/naaec/download/Naaec-e.txt (defining "environmental
law" as "any statute or regulation ... the primary purpose of which is the protection of the
environment, or the prevention of a danger to human life or health"); CRAiG N. JOHNSTON
ET AL., LEGAL PRoTEc'rION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (2d ed. 2007) ("Environmental Law is
law designed to protect the environment, and the plants and animals that rely on it, includ-
ing us."); LAZARUS, supra note 2, at I ("[E]nvironmental law regulates human activity in
order to limit ecological impacts that threaten public health and biodiversity."); Michael C.
Blumm, Studying Environmental Law: A Brief Overview and Readingsfor a Seminar, 12J. ENERGY
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 309, 310 (1992) ("Environmental law is a loose amalgam of
common law and (increasingly) statutory provisions designed to protect public health, eco-
systems, and dependent animal and plant species.").
175 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental "Rule of Law" Litigation, 19 PACE
ENATL. L. REv. 575, 576 (2002) (defining environmental law as "the positive and common
law that reflects environmentalism," which Tarlock in turn defines as "an emerging philos-
ophy or value system which posits that we living humans should assume science-based ethi-
cal stewardship obligations to conserve natural systems for ourselves as well as for future
generations" (footnotes omitted)).
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inclusive definition risks depriving the term of meaning. Employed
expansively, the term environmental "may seem uselessly broad,
describing nothing in particular." 176 If environmental law includes all
laws that affect the natural environment, then virtually every law could
fall within the definition because almost every law affects human be-
havior, and almost every human behavior affects the natural environ-
ment in some respect.1 77 An overinclusive definition also diverges
from common understandings of the term environmental law. Defini-
tions generally should match common usage. 178 A definition of envi-
ronmental law that includes laws that may affect the natural
environment but that were enacted without any conscious considera-
tion of the environment-for example, the aforementioned tax subsi-
dies that encourage the purchase of sport-utility vehicles with low fuel
efficiencies 179-would diverge from what most people understand en-
vironmental law to entail and would likely lead to confusion.
Moreover, such laws raise a different set of issues from laws that
consciously consider the environment. For laws enacted without any
conscious consideration of the environment, the primary issue from
an environmental law perspective is the threshold question of whether
the environment should factor into the law-making institutions' consid-
erations. For laws that reflect a conscious consideration of the envi-
ronment, the question is quite different, albeit not unrelated: how does
the environment factor into the law-making institutions' considera-
tions? This question leads to a set of follow-up questions-for in-
stance, what are the relevant policy trade-offs, what values and
interests do the law-making institutions bring to bear to resolve those
trade-offs, and what legal doctrine is produced as a result of those
choices. These questions never arise with environmental laws that do
not reflect consideration of the environment. This fundamental dif-
ference between the two categories emphasizes the usefulness of a
classification that distinguishes between them instead of lumping
them together.
176 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY. NATURE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 5 (3d ed. 2004); see Tarlock, supra note 11, at 221 ("[T]he term 'environmental'
has become so all-encompassing that it has been robbed of any operative meaning; it needs
contours.").
177 See, e.g., Kim Diana Connolly, TheEcology of Breastfeeding, 13 SE. ENrL. L.J. 157, 157,
165 (2005) (arguing that "laws that support breastfeeding should be considered environ-
mental laws" because such laws reduce "the negative environmental impacts of production
and distribution of artificial baby milk").
178 See Solove, supra note 56, at 1096 (noting that theorists attempting to define privacy
will "examine whether a conception of privacy includes the things we view as private and
excludes the things we do not"); see also id. ("A few things might be left out, but the aim is
to establish a conception that encompasses most of the things that are commonly viewed
under the rubric of 'privacy.'").
179 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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Narrowing the definition of environmental law to include only
laws that focus primarily on protecting the environment or that reflect
an environmentalist ethic, on the other hand, ignores a crucially im-
portant feature of environmental law: the inherent and pervasive
trade-offs in environmental decision making.'80 As a result of these
trade-offs, environmental protection is almost never the only or over-
riding purpose of a law that applies to the environment. Indeed, envi-
ronmental law is better understood as a field in which the goal of
environmental protection sits in a position of constant tension with
countervailing interests and values. Environmental laws always reflect
a balance of objectives, and envisioning environmental law as exclu-
sively or primarily devoted to environmental protection would
counterproductively obscure the essential question of how to balance
among competing goals and interests that include, but are not limited
to, environmental protection.
The best approach to defining environmental law-the approach
that appropriately balances overinclusiveness and underinclusive-
ness-encompasses laws that reflect a consideration of human impacts
on the natural environment. This definition is not limited to laws en-
acted for the primary purpose of protecting the environment but also
excludes laws that unintentionally affect the environment. Thus, for
example, natural-resource laws that prescribe both conservation and
exploitation should be considered environmental laws, whereas tax
subsidies that encourage the purchase of sport-utility vehicles with low
fuel efficiencies should not be considered environmental laws. Defin-
ing environmental law to encompass laws that reflect a consideration
of human impacts on the natural environment will allow us to study
the various approaches that law-making institutions take to environ-
mental management. 81
180 See infra Part II.C.
181 This definition is not, however, unproblematic. In particular, it fails to illuminate
fully another core characteristic of environmental problems: the pervasiveness of the rela-
tionship between human activities and the natural environment. The allocation of govern-
ment spending between mass transit and roadways, for example, may significantly affect
whether individuals decide to take mass transit or to drive, with concomitant effects on the
environment. But transportation-funding legislation, unless enacted in part to address en-
vironmental impacts, would generally not be considered part of environmental law. Some
provisions of federal pollution statutes, on the other hand, may have little (if any) real
environmental impact. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 513, 33 U.S.C. § 1372 (2006) (setting
forth labor standards for laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or subcontrac-
tors working on water-treatment works funded by Clean Water Act grants). If we are to use
the category of environmental law to think critically about the relationship between law
and the environment, we must examine that relationship both where it is intentional and
where it is unintentional. To include every minor provision of the Clean Water Act within
the definition of environmental law, but to exclude laws not aimed at the environment but
that may have far greater environmental impacts, somewhat misallocates our attention.
Excluding from the definition of environmental law laws that have inadvertent environ-
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C. Factual Context
Having defined what environmental law encompasses, we can
turn to constructing an organizational framework that coheres envi-
ronmental law as a field. Because my objective is to find an under-
standing of how environmental law functions, my approach will be
primarily descriptive rather than prescriptive. To construct our orga-
nizational framework, we will address each of the underlying constitu-
tive dimensions of environmental law-factual context, policy trade-
offs, values and interests, and legal doctrine-beginning with factual
context. Our goal, as Part I established, is to identify core characteris-
tics of environmental problems that, in combination, are both com-
mon and distinct to environmental law. I propose two such
characteristics: (1) physical public resources; and (2) pervasive inter-
relatedness. From these two core characteristics follow other charac-
teristics that also are important to the factual context of
environmental law: temporal and spatial disjunction, and the crucial
yet unattainable nature of detailed scientific information. Moreover,
these core characteristics help to explain the recurring trade-offs that
arise in environmental law.
1. Physical Public Resources
Environmental problems involve a physical resource that is in im-
portant senses publicly rather than privately valued, owned, and/or
controlled. Public lands, including but not limited to lands desig-
nated for preservation, are an obvious example of such a resource.
The government holds title to the lands and controls the use of the
lands on behalf of the public. 182 Public lands also often are associated
mental impacts creates a problematic divide between the study of environmental problems
and environmental law.
Rather than expanding the definition of environmental law to include all laws that are
relevant to the physical environment, which would implicate the aforementioned draw-
backs of overinclusiveness, an additional category can be employed to describe laws that
significantly affect the environment but that do not reflect a conscious consideration of
environmental impacts: indirect environmental law or unintentional environmental law. Al-
though laws that reflect a conscious consideration of human impacts on the environment
always will form the core of environmental-law practice, teaching, and scholarship, unin-
tentional environmental law merits greater attention than it usually receives from environ-
mental lawyers, teachers, and scholars. See, e.g., Michael Shellenberger & Ted Nordhaus,
The Death of Environmentalism: Global Warming Politics in a Post-Environmental World, Soc.
POL'Y, Spring 2005, at 19, 25 (noting that David Brower advocated "the need for the envi-
ronmental community to invest more energy in changing the tax code"). Excluding indi-
rect environmental law from the category of environmental law hinders the insight that
many indirect environmental laws should be direct environmental laws-that is, where en-
vironmental effects of a law are significant, they ought to be managed consciously.
182 See Adell Louise Amos, The Use of State Instream Flow Laws for Federal Lands: Respecting
State Control While Meeting Federal Purposes, 36 ENVrL. L. 1237, 1280 (2006) ("[IFederal pub-
lic lands are managed and the waters are protected for the benefit of the public."). See
generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
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with public values, such as a collective desire for open space, although
they also may have value for individual uses as well. Air, water, and
wildlife are other examples of environmental physical public re-
sources. Although ownership may be less clear than with public lands,
physical public resources are not wholly privately owned and con-
trolled.' 83 More abstractly, environmental values such as picturesque
views and biodiversity resemble public resources with a physical com-
ponent. They arise as a collective result of individual action and are
enjoyed collectively by the public as well.
The interrelationship among uses of public resources, and the
special difficulties with attempting to regulate conflicts among uses in
the environmental context, lies at the heart of all problems that arise
in environmental law.' 8 4 Wanting clean air or wanting to burn coal to
generate electricity are not themselves environmental problems; the
problem is when those uses conflict, when some people want clean air
and others (or even the same people) want to pollute the air to gener-
ate electricity.' 8 5
Some of the difficulties with addressing use conflicts in environ-
mental law are not distinct to the environmental context, but rather
arise in many common-resource situations. Public resources pose dif-
ficulties in a society like ours organized around an economic system
based on markets and private property and around a political and le-
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 476-491 (1970) (outlining the basic elements of Ameri-
can public-trust law and explaining the various reasons and conceptions behind the public-
trust doctrine).
183 SeeHughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979) (concluding that "state regu-
lations of wild animals should be considered according to the same general rule applied to
state regulations of other natural resources"); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
260-61 (1946) (declining to recognize private property rights to airspace); Michael C.
Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categori-
cal Takings Defenses, 29 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 352-53 (2005) (discussing state owner-
ship of wild animals); Dave Owen, Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and Fall
of CalFed, 37 ENVrL. L. 1145, 1179-80 (2007) (noting that "water rights users may own
usufructuary rights, but the state owns the water and watercourses, and holds the latter as
trustee for its people" (footnotes omitted)).
184 1 intentionally elide here the economist's distinction between use and non-use valu-
ation of environmental resources. See, e.g., Thomas A. More et al., Values and Economics in
Environmental Management: A Perspective and Critique, 48 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 397, 398 (1996)
(distinguishing use values, which "apply to the benefits a resource produces for those who
actually use it," and non-use values, which "concern benefits received by those who do not
use it"); see also id. ("The distinction between use and non-use values is not well defined
and may not always be clear .... Non-use benefits have been subdivided into existence
value (the value people receive from simply knowing a resource exists), altruism (the value
derived from having other contemporaries use a resource) and bequest value (preserving a
resource for future generations)."). I employ the term "use" expansively, to include bene-
fits associated with what economists would call non-use values-for example, I count ap-
preciation of the existence of an environmental resource as a use.
185 Cf R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECoN. 1, 2 (1960) (examining
situations of conflicting use).
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gal system based on individual rights. When individuals have unregu-
lated access to public resources, they tend to overuse them, because
each individual user enjoys the full benefits of her use, whereas the
costs of her use are shared among everyone who uses or benefits from,
or could use or benefit from, the resource. 186 Management of public
resources therefore requires collective action among or on behalf of
the users and beneficiaries to limit use of the resources to optimal
levels.' 87 The difficulties of instituting collective action have been
widely noted.18 8 Individual users must be convinced of their interest
in the public resource and of the need for management to limit its
use. 189 The greater the number and variation in users, the greater the
difficulty of attempting to organize them into collective action.190 Or-
ganizing requires a leader who is willing to "bear the costs of organiza-
tion and focus the attention of a diffuse, disconnected collection of
individuals." 19' Individual users of the public resource, who continue
to have a strong incentive to free ride on the efforts of others, are
likely to resist efforts to limit their use of a public resource, even if
they recognize the need for limits on overall use. 192
186 See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45
(1968); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons,
30 ENVTL. L. 241, 242 (2000). Economists refer to this effect as a negative externality (be-
cause the individual does not face the full costs of his or her action) or the tragedy of the
commons (referring to the incentive to overuse public resources).
187 See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
574-75 (2001).
188 See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 20-22 (1982); MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1-2 (rev. ed.
1971); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 6-7 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990).
189 See Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 770 (2008)
("Similarly situated citizens may act in disparate ways that collectively lead to the least pre-
ferred outcome, because they do not see, or at least do not prioritize, the commonalities
among them. They may fall victim to preference cycling in which even those with similar
preferences may struggle to achieve lasting agreement.").
190 See Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 EN vrL. L. 515, 527
(2007) (noting that as the group size increases, so too do collective action costs); GeorgeJ.
Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 359, 360-62 (1974).
191 Kang, supra note 189, at 770; see also HARDIN, supra note 188, at 35-37 (noting the
need for political entrepreneurs "who, for their own career reasons, find it in their private
interest to work to provide collective benefits to relevant groups").
192 See OSTROM, supra note 188, at 36; Stigler, supra note 190, at 359-60. Dan Kahan
has criticized some of the precepts of collective-action literature, arguing that empirical
social science shows that, "[i]n collective-action settings, individuals adopt not a materially
calculating posture but rather a richer, more emotionally nuanced reciprocal one." Dan M.
Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REv. 71, 71
(2003). According to Kahan, individuals will willingly contribute to collective action if they
trust that others "will voluntarily respond in kind." Id. at 72. As applied to public re-
sources that are widely used in relative anonymity, however, the results of Kahan's frame-
work do not necessarily diverge from the results of conventional public-choice analysis. In
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In addition to these standard difficulties of instituting collective
action to regulate a common resource, several characteristics of envi-
ronmental public resources make them particularly difficult to man-
age or regulate collectively. First, the environment, in its many forms,
is traditionally an unregulated public resource, often associated with
long traditions and customs of relatively uninhibited exploitation and
open access. 193 Users perceive these traditions and customs as confer-
ring entitlements and accordingly often strongly resist efforts to limit
their uses of the environment. 194 Second, environmental public re-
sources often have extremely numerous, valuable, and varied uses,
which increases the probability and intractability of conflicts among
users and decreases the likelihood of effective collective action.
Third, the numerousness of users and the often complex lines of cau-
sation that create interrelationships among uses mean that, when con-
flicts among uses arise, it can be exceedingly difficult or impossible for
any user harmed by the conflict to trace her harm to any particular
other user or beneficiary.1 95 Fourth, the same factors-numerous
users and complex causation-make it relatively easy for users to ig-
nore, or not recognize, their causal role in affecting another use.
Fifth, the objectives of regulating the environment are often difficult
to evaluate, because they are not valued either economically as the
subject of traditional market transactions or politically as the subject
of traditional individual rights. 196 This difficulty is especially apparent
when, as is often the case, environmental harms are difficult to per-
ceive and measure and when the benefits associated with protecting
the environment involve existence value rather than use value, or
particular, if the users are numerous and varied and can free ride in relative anonymity,
building the requisite trust among users is likely to be difficult.
193 Cf Manus, supra note 5, 518 ("The American jural system is based on a fundamen-
tal presumption that people bear no moral duties to refrain from exploiting the
environment .... ").
194 See, e.g., Ray Rasker, Wilderness for Its Own Sake or as Economic Asset?, 25 J. LAND RE-
SOURCES & ENVrL. L. 15, 15 (2005) ("[1]n the remote corners of the rural West, with a long
history of dependence on public lands for mining, energy development and logging, the
idea of setting aside land for conservation is seen as a direct affront to the well-being of
local residents."); see also Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 281 (1987)
("Strong initial views are resistant to change because they influence the way that subse-
quent information is interpreted.").
195 See LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 33 ("[D]ue to the highly interrelated nature of the
ecosystem, it is almost always a mistake to suppose that one can isolate a single discrete
cause as the source of an environmental problem"); Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's
Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. Rv. 703, 747
(2000) ("[E]nvironmental harms are more typically the cumulative and synergistic result of
multiple actions, often spread over significant time and space. This is primarily traceable to
the sharing inherent in any common natural resource base, which is the object of so many
simultaneous and sporadic actions over time and space.").
196 Cf Lazarus, supra note 195, at 748 ("Many of the ecological injuries resulting from
environmental degradation are not readily susceptible to monetary valuation and have a
distinctively nonhuman character.").
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(even more so) intrinsic value independent of utility or tangible bene-
fit to humans.
As an illustration of some of these difficulties, take the example
of waterways such as rivers or lakes. Waterways are subject to many
and varied uses, including public-water-system sources, irrigation
sources, pollution sinks, navigation, flood control, recreation, and aes-
thetic pleasure. For many major waterways, thousands or millions of
individuals and businesses partake in or benefit from one or more of
these uses. Potential conflicts among the uses, and among prospective
users of the same use, are obvious. Polluted waterways are more diffi-
cult to use for safe drinking water and less desirable for recreation;
and water used for irrigation is unavailable for other uses. The canoe-
ist whose enjoyment of the waterway is impaired by the stench emanat-
ing from its polluted waters, however, may find it difficult to attribute
that harm to any particular pollution source. But the difficulties of
the sole canoeist pale in comparison to those of a regulator faced with
an overwhelming number of desired uses of a resource, connected by
a complex web of interrelationships that create a dizzying array of
conflicts and synergies.
2. Pervasive Interrelatedness
Everything in the environment, including humans, is part of a
pervasively interrelated ecological system. 197 This pervasive interrelat-
edness sometimes is referred to as the First Law of Ecology.198 The
media of these interrelationships frequently are the physical public
resources that comprise the environment-for example, a river that
carries nitrates from the fertilizers a farmer applies to his fields down-
stream to a tadpole that experiences developmental deformities from
nitrate exposure. The interrelatedness creates connections that can
cross great physical distance and time. Air pollutants emitted into the
197 See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1273 (1985); Kelly
Nolen, Residents at Risk: Wildlife and the Bureau of Land Management's Planning Process, 26
ENVTL. L. 771, 779 (1996) ("Animals and plants within an ecosystem are intricately interre-
lated, and the decline of any one species may have serious effects on the balance of the
entire system, with unexpected consequences for humans.").
198 See, e.g., BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND TECHNOLOGY
33-39 (1971); ZygmuntJ.B. Plater, Environmental Law in the Political Ecosystem-Coping with
the Reality of Politics, 19 PACE ENVrL. L. Rev. 423, 480 n.77 (2002); see also PLA'ER ET AL.,
supra note 176, at 5 ("[The environmental perspective] starts from the premise of intercon-
nectedness-that all human enterprises exist within one vast shared common context in
which actions have collateral consequences that are relevant and should be considered
.... "); id. at xxx ("As the First Law of Ecology says, everything is connected to everything
else."); id. at 5 ("[T]he environmental perspective conceptualizes all human enterprises
existing within one large system of interconnected systems.").
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air in Asia drift across the Pacific Ocean to California. 199 Smoking
and asbestos exposure have a synergistic interaction, resulting in a
greater risk of lung cancer than what can be attributed to the separate
effects of smoking and asbestos. 20 0 Organochlorine compounds accu-
mulate in animal lipid tissue over time, affecting development and
reproduction. 20 1
The pervasive interrelatedness among elements of the environ-
ment makes the environment a highly complex system that often is
exceedingly difficult to manage. As we have seen, the objective of en-
vironmental law is to resolve conflicts among uses. The complexity
and pervasive interrelatedness of the environment, however, make it
extremely difficult to decide which activities need to be regulated to
what extent in order to achieve a desired balance. Any particular im-
pact on a use of a resource may arise from numerous, difficult-to-iden-
tify causal events. Conversely, every event may contribute to
numerous, difficult-to-identify impacts. Pervasive interrelatedness
thus contributes to the extraordinarily complex lines of causation that
often characterize environmental problems. It may be difficult or im-
possible to determine with any precision a particular action's innu-
merable causes and effects that ripple throughout the environment.
Not surprisingly, unintended consequences are a recurring phenome-
non in environmental law.20 2
199 See AndrewJacobs, U.N. Report Points to Perilfrom Noxious 'Brown Clouds, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2008, at A6.
200 See Thomas C. Erren et al., Synergy Between Asbestos and Smoking on Lung Cancer Risks,
10 EPIDEMIOLOGY 405, 409 (1999); see alsoJun Peng et al., Iron and Paraquat as Synergistic
Environmental Risk Factors in Sporadic Parkinson's Disease Accelerate Age-Related Neurodegenera-
tion, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 6914, 6919 (2007) (reporting findings suggesting that increased
oral intake of iron in the neonatal period and environmental exposure to the pesticide
paraquat have a synergistic effect on increasing the risk of neurodegeneration associated
with Parkinson's disease).
201 See Karen A. Glennemeier & LindaJ. Begnoche, Impact of Organochlorine Contamina-
tion on Amphibian Populations in Southwestern Michigan, 36J. HERPETOLOGY 233, 233 (2002).
202 See, e.g.,James L. Huffman, Marketing Biodiversity, 38 IDAHo L. REv. 421, 425 (2002)
(noting that domestic environmental regulation of industry may export environmental
degradation to other countries);J.B. Ruhl &James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The
Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 814 (2003) (noting
the problem of "media-shifting," in which "pollution-control laws protecting one environ-
mental medium (for example, air, water, or land) . . . generat[e] . . . pollution in alterna-
tive media"); Erin Ryan, New Orleans, the Chesapeake, and the Future of Environmental
Assessment: Overcoming the Natural Resources Law of Unintended Consequences, 40 U. RiCH. L.
REV. 981, 984-85 (2006) (noting that, when "Virginia resource managers attempted to
protect intertidal wetlands by establishing a development-free jurisdictional boundary...
landowners then built all the way to the legal side of the line .... [which] inadvertently
doomed the protected wetlands by disconnecting them from the natural shoreline systems
that sustain them during such periods of sea-level rise" and thereby "accomplished the
exact opposite of what policymakers had hoped for"); David Sunding & David Zilberman,
Consideration of Economics under California's Porter-Cologne Act, 13 HASTINGS W.-N.w. J. ENvrL.
L. & POL'Y 73, 96 (2007) ("Water quality regulation that aims to improve environmental
quality can have unintended consequences that harm the environment and natural re-
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3. Secondary Characteristics
The core characteristics of environmental problems-physical
public resources and pervasive interrelatedness-give rise to other,
secondary characteristics that also are important for understanding
environmental law.
Temporal and Spatial Disjunctions. The pervasive interrelatedness
among elements of the environment creates complex lines of causa-
tion that often span considerable distance and time. These effects can
lead to temporal and spatial disjunctions that are important to envi-
ronmental decision making. Common examples of such disjunction
include the discharge-exposure disjunction, where a discharged pollutant
travels a great distance, over a long time, or both before a person,
animal, or plant is exposed to it. Polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"),
for example, which are highly toxic synthetic organic chemicals manu-
factured in the United States from 1929 until 1977, do not readily
break down in the environment and therefore can persist for years,
carried worldwide in a series of cycles of volatilization into the atmos-
phere and then redeposited to the surface. 203 Another example of a
disjunction is the exposure-effect disjunction, where an adverse health ef-
fect does not manifest itself for months, years, or even decades after a
person is exposed to an environmental hazard. 20 4 Individuals ex-
posed to asbestos, for example, may not contract mesothelioma for six
to almost forty-five years after their exposure. 20 5 A cost-benefit disjunc-
tion arises when, as is often true, the benefits of using the environment
are experienced immediately, but the costs are not experienced until
much later.20 6
These disjunctions create difficulties for environmental lawmak-
ing. Environmental effects manifest themselves over a much broader
expanse of space and time than humans and institutions typically con-
sources. The reallocation of water from one location to another, to meet water quality
regulation, may reduce the well-being of fish and wildlife dependent on the water in the
source region. Reduction of use of chemical pesticides that reduce farm productivity may
lead to an increase in utilized land and expansion of the utilized land base to wilderness
areas. Diversion of water resources to meet environmental quality objectives may reduce
the capacity to utilize this water in provision of environmental amenities.").
203 See AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., TOxICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS 1-3, 16, 479, 481
(2000).
204 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corpo-
rate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1203, 1237 (2002) ("[Tlhe injuries to human health and the
environment of particular substances may take years to manifest themselves.").
205 See A. Chovil & C. Stewart, Latency Period for Mesothelioma, 314 LANCET 853, 853
(1979).
206 See Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive
Justice and Efficiency, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 79, 110 n.63 (2007) ("[G]reater use of natural
resources or degradation of the environment [sometimes] produces immediate benefits
but long-term costs.").
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sider in their decision making; in many respects, it is still unclear
whether humans have the capacity to understand and plan over the
scope required for effective environmental lawmaking.20 7
Scientific Uncertainty. Numerous scientific questions underlie any
environmental problem. The standard approach to regulation calls
for regulating an activity to reduce or avoid the harm that it can
cause. 20 8 For environmental problems, the link between a harm and
its cause or causes runs through the medium of an ecological system
comprised of a complex web of pervasively interrelated constituent
elements. The pervasive interrelatedness among components of the
natural environment and the temporal and spatial disjunction be-
tween the causes and effects of environmental disruption are ex-
tremely complicated factors that make environmental effects much
more difficult to predict or even to ascertain retrospectively. 209 Often
these questions are at the frontier of science, arising in areas in which
we have little empirical data and lack understanding of the natural
interactions and processes. Policy makers look to science to untangle
that web, but there is never complete scientific information. The criti-
cal impact of scientific uncertainty combined with its inevitability
make a thorough understanding of environmental problems both
highly important and wholly unattainable. As a result, environmental
law requires decision making in a context of great scientific
uncertainty. 210
207 See Richard J. Lazarus, Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Environ-
mental Law, 24 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 231, 239 (2005) ("The need for environmental law can be
seen as arising from the persistent gap between the spatial and temporal horizons of
human nature and the much wider and longer spatial and temporal dimensions of the
consequences of human activities because of the laws of nature."); see also Holly Doremus,
Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 295, 318-19 (2003) (identify-
ing the durability-flexibility dilemma by explaining that, because environmental problems
often develop over extended periods of time, environmental policies "must be durable
over unusually long periods of time" yet also must be "flexible enough to respond to new
information and changing conditions"); id. at 320-21 ("Human beings are prone to wish-
ful thinking, tending to underestimate the seriousness of problems, to overestimate the
effectiveness of efforts to solve them, and to assume that the future will make them easier
to solve.").
208 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands III Regulation of Solid and
Hazardous Waste Management, 13 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 3, 54 (1994) ("Obviously, the purpose of
most environmental regulation is to prevent environmental harm and adverse effects on
human health." (footnote omitted)).
209 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 207, at 240 ("[T]he further that the laws of nature
spread cause and effect out over time and space, the more scientific uncertainty there will
be regarding whether the adverse environmental effects projected in the future will in fact
ever happen and whether the adverse environmental effects perceived today were in fact
caused by specific activities in distant locations and times.").
210 See Doremus, supra note 207, at 318-21 (discussing the uncertainties that make
"objectively determinate solutions tantalizingly appealing yet impossible to achieve");
Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism and the Environmental
Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV. 851, 855 (2003) ("[S]cientific uncertainty [in environmental reg-
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4. Other Characteristics
I am not the first to identify fundamental characteristics of envi-
ronmental law. For example, Richard Lazarus argues that a "common
denominator" unifying environmental law is the concept of "ecologi-
cal injury," which in turn implicates certain "recurring features" of the
factual context of environmental law. 21 1 Lazarus identifies six such
features: (1) "Irreversible, Catastrophic, and Continuing Injury"; (2)
"Physically Distant Injury"; (3) "Temporally Distant Injury"; (4) "Un-
certainty and Risk"; (5) "Multiple Causes"; and (6) "Noneconomic,
Nonhuman Character." 212 These features of ecological injury, in
turn, result in environmental laws that exhibit the "dominant charac-
teristics" of "complexity, scientific uncertainty, dynamism, precaution,
and controversy." 213 In addition, Holly Doremus identifies "four dis-
tinctive features [of environmental problems] that make them espe-
cially intractable": (1) "high levels of uncertainty"; (2) "conflicts
between socially contested yet strongly held values"; (3) the necessity
of collective action; and (4) the necessity of durable yet flexible
solutions.214
The characteristics that Lazarus and Doremus describe are im-
portant and recurring characteristics in environmental law. But I
would argue that the core characteristics I have identified-physical
public resources and pervasive interrelatedness-are independent,
primary features from which Lazarus's and Doremus's characteristics
derive. Accordingly, Lazarus's and Doremus's characteristics overlap
considerably with what I am calling secondary characteristics of envi-
ronmental law. Although, for example, Lazarus and Doremus are un-
doubtedly correct that uncertainty is prevalent in environmental
policy making, uncertainty is not distinctive to the environment but
rather pervasive in many facets of life and therefore many legal
fields.21 5 Moreover, the uncertainty in environmental decision mak-
ing is largely attributable to the pervasive interrelationships that com-
ulation] is endemic."); Robert L. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the Institu-
tional Design of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQuY 196, 206 (2008);
Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law:
Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2420 (1995); Richard Lazarus,
Survey Says: Court Doesn't Get It, 17 ENVTL. F. 44, 45 (2000); Lazarus, supra note 195, at 747.
211 Lazarus, supra note 195, at 745.
212 Id. at 745-48. But see Wexler, supra note 114, at 286 (arguing that the features
Lazarus identifies, although "remarkable," "are not clearly entirely distinct from harms in
other areas of law").
213 LAzARus, supra note 2, at 16 (emphasis omitted).
214 Doremus, supra note 207, at 318-19.
215 See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the
Holdup Problem, 61 SMU L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) ("The problem of uncertainty is perva-
sive in all contract negotiations."); Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-
Based Rules, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1181, 1262 (2008) ("[R] elational tax planning is surrounded
by pervasive uncertainty.").
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prise ecological systems.216 To understand environmental law as a
distinctive legal field, therefore, it is better to focus on the core char-
acteristic that gives rise to the uncertainty that Lazarus and Doremus
note.21
7
D. Policy Trade-offs
The factual context in which environmental law operates-physi-
cal public resources subject to numerous uses connected by an intri-
cate web of pervasive interrelationships-creates certain key policy
trade-offs that frame lawmaking choices. To date, the dominant para-
digm frames these trade-offs as pitting economic welfare against envi-
ronmental protection. 218 The economy/environment trade-off can
be a powerful lens. It accounts for much of the politics of environ-
mental lawmaking, in which environmental groups (representing "the
environment") pursue regulation while the regulated community
(representing "the economy") fights it. Moreover, there is certainly
some factual truth to the economy/environment trade-off: many envi-
ronmental laws are quite costly.219 For this reason and others, it some-
times will be appropriate and helpful to cast the principal trade-off in
environmental lawmaking as "economics versus environment."
The economics/environment trade-off is, however, an oversimpli-
fied generalization. The realities of the environmental decision-mak-
ing context are more complicated and more nuanced than
"economics versus environment" indicates, and therefore, looking at
environmental decision making solely or principally through the lens
of the economy/environment trade-off obscures important insights
into environmental lawmaking. The principal problem with the econ-
omy/environment trade-off is that economic interests and environ-
mental protection are not as monolithic, nor as conflicting, as the
trade-off suggests.
First, environmental protection itself provides numerous eco-
nomic benefits. Cleaner air is associated with various benefits of eco-
216 See LAzARus, supra note 2, at 19 (tracing scientific uncertainty in environmental
lawmaking to "the elaborate intricacies of the workings of the natural environment").
217 Lazarus and Doremus compiled their lists for purposes other than defining envi-
ronmental law as a distinctive legal field; the differences between their lists and my own
therefore may be attributable to our differing purposes rather than to any disagreement.
See LtAzus, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that his list of characteristics reflects "the problem
of ecological injury"); Doremus, supra note 207, at 318 (noting that her list of characteris-
tics reflects what makes environmental problems "especially intractable").
218 SeeJ.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in Envi-
ronmental Law, 68 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 522, 523 (2000) (book review).
219 See, e.g., U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CL.AN AIR ACT,
1970 TO 1990, at ES-2 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/copy.htnl (re-
porting that the direct costs of implementing the Clean Air Act from 1970 to 1990 totaled
$523 billion).
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nomic value, such as reduced health-care costs for treating respiratory
difficulties. 220 The decision to allow additional air pollution therefore
poses a trade-off notjust between economic benefits and environmen-
tal benefits but also between conflicting economic benefits: the bene-
fits of using the air as a waste sink and the benefits of reduced health-
care costs from cleaner air. Conflicting economic benefits also arise
from temporal trade-offs, as using an environmental resource in a par-
ticular way at one time may preclude the same use later. For example,
pumping groundwater from an underground aquifer to use for irri-
gating farmland may preclude or limit later use of the aquifer.22'
Thus, in many situations, environmental lawmaking poses a trade-off
among different economic benefits.
Second, environmental protection also is not as monolithic as the
economy/environment trade-off suggests. Different uses that we com-
monly associate with environmental protection may conflict in a par-
ticular situation. 22 2 Hiking, camping, and other recreational uses may
impair the quality of plant and wildlife habitat. Ecosystem restoration
may require the elimination or reduction of nonnative plants and
wildlife. Filtering out pollutants from wastewater or air emissions may
generate solid wastes. Regulating industrial activity more stringently
in California may induce new industrial activity in other states. 223
Thus, in many situations, environmental lawmaking poses a trade-off
among different environmental benefits.
These economic/economic trade-offs and environment/environ-
ment trade-offs are as important to understanding the problems that
arise in environmental law as the economy/environment trade-off.
Thus, as a framework for analyzing environmental lawmaking, the
economy/environment trade-off overgeneralizes and oversimplifies to
an extent that limits its explanatory power. Thinking about environ-
mental law in terms of "economy versus environment" may simplify
the issues, but it does so without enough benefit. It does not, for ex-
ample, illuminate any clear patterns in environmental-law doctrine. 224
220 See id. at ES-6 tbl.ES-3 (estimating economic values for "[u]nit[s] of [a]voided
[e]ffect[s]").
221 Cf Glennon, supra note 31, at 1874 ("In many parts of the country, fresh water
reserves have been depleted; diversions have dried up rivers and pumping has exhausted
aquifers.").
222 See generally Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 202, at 812-17 (explaining that environ-
mental law is full of unintended consequences).
223 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
224 See Ruhl, supra note 218, at 523 (characterizing environmental lawmaking as a "war
of annihilation" between "two extreme and opposing philosophies-one devoted to pro-
tecting the economy and the other to protecting the environment. . . that has left in its
wake the mish-mash of laws, regulations, judicial opinions, and countless administrative
decisions and policies" and hence "environmental law has no agenda, no theme, no way of
thinking" and "lacks any coherent philosophy").
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Rather than replacing the economy/environment trade-off with
another oversimplified generalization with similar shortcomings, con-
sider the policy trade-offs in environmental lawmaking more contex-
tually: thinking in terms of the various competing uses that can be
made of environmental resources provides a promising analytical
framework for studying environmental lawmaking. The available op-
tions to manage an environmental resource can be determined by ar-
ranging all possible combinations of nonconflicting uses. Each
scenario, or combination of nonconflicting uses, is associated with a
set of benefits that derive from those uses. The differences among the
different scenarios represent the trade-offs posed by environmental
lawmaking. Thinking in terms of use conflicts provides a coherent
analytical framework for understanding environmental lawmaking.
The idea of use conflicts is, of course, neither original to this Arti-
cle nor unique to the environmental context. Disputes over natural
resources often are characterized in terms of use conflicts. 225 And it
was almost fifty years ago that Ronald Coase advocated what is essen-
tially a use-conflict framework for a variety of land-use problems, in-
cluding but not limited to environmental disputes.226 Generally,
however, prior references to use conflicts, even in the environmental
context, have not linked them to the distinctive characteristics of the
environmental context: physical public resources with pervasive inter-
relatedness. In addition, prior references to use conflicts in environ-
mental or natural-resource law and policy generally have not
extended the term to the full spectrum of benefits derived from envi-
ronmental resources. Appreciation of an environmental resource
may not always involve an active or consumptive use of the resource,
but it is a use nonetheless. 227 Moreover, it is a use that includes a
crucial physical component, in that appreciation of the environmental
225 See, e.g., McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing
a dispute over the use of a snowmobile on a route within Glacier National Park as present-
ing a problem of "use conflicts"); Nev. Land Action Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713,
719 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1600-87, "directs the [Forest] Service to manage conflicting uses of forest resources"
(citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600, 160 4 (g) (3) (1988))); Letter from Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield to Edi-
torial Staff, 22 ENVrL. L. 792, 793 (1992) ("Throughout this country, we are faced within
[sic] increasing conflicts over the use of our natural resources.")
226 See Coase, supra note 185, at 2 (suggesting approaching the problem of contamina-
tion of a stream as a question of whether to use the stream for fish habitat or as a waste sink
and the total and marginal value of each use (citing G.J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 105
(1952))); see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA.
L. REv. 965, 1000 (2004) ("To Coase, the economic problem of externalities was essentially
one of conflicting resource use.").
227 Cf Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Option
and existence values may represent 'passive' use, but they nonetheless reflect utility derived
by humans from a resource. .. ").
20101
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
resource depends to a significant extent on the physical condition of
the resource.
E. Values and Interests
Trade-offs are only part of lawmaking; equally important are the
values and interests that lawmaking institutions bring to bear on the
relevant trade-offs in order to make decisions that produce law.228 As
with the economy/environment trade-off, we could frame our descrip-
tion of the values and interests in environmental lawmaking in terms
of abstract, general principles or goals: environmental protection, dis-
tributional equity, equity, economic growth, freedom from regulation,
and so forth. But a descriptive analysis framed with abstract, genera-
lized values and interests suffers from the same problems as the over-
simplified generalization of the economy/environment trade-off. We
are unlikely to learn much about how environmental lawmaking func-
tions by trying to discern whether lawmaking institutions value envi-
ronmental protection in the abstract, or even whether lawmaking
institutions value environmental protection comparatively more or
less than some other value, such as economic well-being, abstracted
from any particular decision.
To the contrary, a descriptive analysis of the values and interests
in environmental lawmaking begins to yield meaningful insights only
when values and interests are framed specifically enough to tie them
to conflicting use demands on environmental resources. For exam-
ple, trying to determine whether the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice ("NMFS") values sustainable fisheries in the abstract is unlikely to
yield concrete insight into the functioning of fisheries regulation. But
determining whether NMFS closed a fishery when necessary to pre-
serve the fishery's long-term viability229 over the objections of the fish-
ing industry concerned with its own financial viability2 30 provides
228 An examination of the various kinds of values associated with environmental deci-
sion making, and potential taxonomies of those values, is beyond the scope of this Article.
For works addressing these topics, see Andrew Brennan, Moral Pluralism and the Environ-
ment, I ENVTL. VALUES 15, 19-21 (1992) (defining and distinguishing among demand,
nondemand, use, option, existence, and transformative values); Lockwood, supra note 98,
at 382 (defining and distinguishing among intrinsic, instrumental, functional, held, and
assigned values). The use-conflict framework outlined here is inclusive enough to encom-
pass a broad range of understandings of values potentially associated with environmental
resources.
229 See 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1) (A) (2006) (providing that fishery management plans
shall "contain the conservation and management measures ... necessary and appropriate
for the conservation and management of the fishery, to prevent overfishing and rebuild
overfished stocks, and to protect, restore, and promote the long-term health and stability
of the fishery").
230 Cf Jerry McBeath, Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Service: Steller Sea Lions
and Commercial Fisheries in the North Pacific, 21 ALASKA L. REv. 1, 9 (2004) ("NMFS's mission
in fisheries development and management brings it into close association with the fishing
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useful information about the relevant values and interests at play,
thereby shedding meaningful light on environmental lawmaking.
Similarly, trying to determine whether the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) regulations promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air
Act 231 are efficient in the abstract is not as useful to understanding
environmental lawmaking as evaluating the relative efficiency of pol-
icy options before the EPA and determining why the agency some-
times chooses a less efficient option.
Thus, as with trade-offs, the values and interests associated with
environmental lawmaking are best analyzed descriptively in reference
to the potential uses of environmental resources and the conflicts
among those uses in particular.
F. Legal Doctrine
As the Introduction noted, commentators have bemoaned the in-
coherence of environmental law as a body of legal doctrine. 232 There
do not appear to be any fundamental, unifying substantive principles
that explain all of environmental law, and I will not propose any.
Rather, I want to make two interrelated points about the incoherence
of environmental-law doctrine. First, the incoherence of environmen-
tal law provides fertile material for investigation and analysis.233 We
have much to learn from environmental law's incoherence, and inco-
herence can play a constructive role in the development of environ-
mental law. Second, although the substance of environmental-law
doctrine cannot be reduced to a few fundamental principles, this does
not mean that environmental law lacks a conceptual core. Organiza-
tional frameworks such as the one proposed in this Article, which fo-
cus on patterns in dimensions of environmental law other than legal
doctrine, can provide a coherent understanding of environmental
lawmaking.
As to the benefits of environmental law's incoherence, there is a
strong ad-hoc, muddling-through character to environmental lawmak-
ing as it has proceeded to date in this country. In part, this reflects
industry and exposes the agency to criticism that the economic interests it regulates dic-
tates its actions.").
231 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (b) (2006) (directing EPA to issue performance standards
for new stationary sources of air pollution); id. § 7412(d) (directing EPA to issue emission
standards for sources of hazardous air pollutants).
232 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
233 See Fisher et al., supra note 4, at 220 ("The incoherence of environmental law is not
something that must (or can) be tamed by the intellectual efforts of environmental law
scholars; rather it is the acceptance of that incoherence, and its methodological treatment,
that marks mature environmental law scholarship."). Theodore Ruger has made a similar
argument with respect to the incoherence of health law. See Ruger, supra note 22, at 639
(contending that the "messiness and complexity" of health law "is part of what makes
health law important and unique, and provides fertile terrain for generalized study").
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the fact that environmental-law doctrine consists of a variety of legal
forms with different origins and foundations.2 34 The incoherence of
environmental-law doctrine also reflects an instability in values-that
is, a lack of societal consensus about how to manage our relationship
with the natural environment. 23 5 But the incoherence of environmen-
tal law runs deeper than a variety of forms or an instability of values.
The incoherence reflects the ongoing struggles of environmental law,
and in that sense incoherence is a functional and perhaps productive
reaction to the extreme difficulties environmental law confronts. The
factual characteristics of the environment-physical public resources
subject to numerous, pervasively interrelated uses-give environmen-
tal problems a scale and complexity that severely taxes, and may even
surpass, the abilities of human understanding and decision making.
In the environmental-lawmaking context, uncertainty is endemic.
Lawmaking institutions respond to these challenges with an ad-hoc
mix of policies, struggling to find something that works. Pragmatic
experimentation produces incoherence.
Moreover, some of what we perceive as incoherence in environ-
mental-law doctrine is actually variation, whether intentional or unin-
tentional. Different use conflicts create different trade-offs and yield
different environmental laws. Regulatory approaches evolve over time
as lawmaking institutions' understanding of environmental problems,
and of the effects of environmental policies, changes. When a policy
approach does not function as intended, new approaches are tried.
There is no strong force pushing lawmaking institutions toward coher-
ence in their approach to environmental problems, and, in light of
the benefits of variation, it is not clear that this is such a bad thing.
One understandably could ask whether, in the face of this inco-
herence (and variation), there is enough to hold environmental law
together as a field. I believe the answer is yes. An analytical frame-
work like the one set forth in this Article can cohere environmental
lawmaking conceptually, even if it does not and cannot distill environ-
mental law into coherent doctrine. In this Article, I have identified
patterns along other dimensions of environmental law-in factual
context, policy trade-offs, and values and interests-that together pro-
vide a useful framework for analyzing and understanding the process
of environmental lawmaking. 236 The relationship among these pat-
terns can be represented with a conceptual diagram of environmental
234 See Fisher ct al., supra note 4, at 225 ("[E]nvironmental law regimes tend to be
complicated mixtures of established legal concepts, sui generis reforms, non-legal regula-
tory ideals, policy and legal norms from a range of different jurisdictions.").
235 Tarlock, supra note 11, at 223.
236 See supra Part II.C-E.
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law, just as I earlier represented a conceptual diagram of a generic
legal field:
FIGURE 2: CONCEPTUAL DIAGRAM OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Factual Context - Policy Trade-offs
Physical Public Resources Defined by Use Conflicts
+ -- Legal Doctrine
Pervasive Interrelatedness ' Ad Hoc, Muddling
Values and Interests Through
Best Viewed in Terms of Uses
Rather than Abstract Categories
Environmental problems share this conceptual pattern, but the
substance of environmental problems-the specific trade-offs and val-
ues at issue, and the legal doctrine that results from the application of
those values and interests to those trade-offs through lawmaking
processes-depends heavily on specifics of context that vary from situ-
ation to situation and defy generalization.
G. Advantages
Conceptualizing environmental law with an organizational frame-
work that focuses on use conflicts carries several advantages over alter-
native frameworks. First, thinking of environmental lawmaking in
terms of use conflicts helpfully highlights the fundamental difficulties
of the environmental context. For example, environmental lawmak-
ing requires lawmaking institutions to resolve trade-offs among con-
flicting uses (or combinations of uses), but the immense complexity
of the interrelationships in the environment renders our understand-
ing of the environment incomplete and makes the precise nature of
those trade-offs difficult to ascertain. Moreover, the pervasive interre-
lationships of the environment prevent lawmaking institutions from
simplifying their decision making by narrowing their focus.
Second, unlike many frameworks that have been proposed for
thinking about environmental law,23 7 a use-conflict framework does
not assume any particular baseline by which to judge alternative legal
arrangements. Moreover, a use-conflict framework does not favor any
particular use of the environment as normatively superior. Instead, a
use-conflict framework provides a relatively value-neutral approach
that facilitates a full comparison of alternatives. Because it is a de-
scriptive framework, a use-conflict framework does not favor any par-
ticular alternative but rather provides a useful basis for evaluating
alternative normative frameworks. For example, a proponent of a so-
237 See, e.g., supra Part II.A.3 (criticizing Tarlock's and Westbrook's proposed
frameworks on this ground).
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cial-utility-maximization normative framework would favor choosing
the legal rule associated with "the set of uses that maximizes the over-
all value of all resources. '2 38
H. Transcendence
Can environmental law answer the analogue of Judge Easter-
brook's challenge to cyberlaw, 239 to which Lessig responded, 240 by
yielding any distinctive yet transcendent insights? That is to say, does
environmental law illuminate any "lessons for law generally"?241 I be-
lieve it does, and in particular I believe that the idea of pervasive inter-
relatedness, which is so important to environmental law's task of
managing the natural environment, is a concept that has important
and far-reaching implications for the law generally.
We have seen that pervasive interrelatedness is a fundamental
characteristic of the environmental context, crucial to understanding
environmental problems.242 Pervasive interrelatedness is distinctive to
environmental law but also transcendent, with implications through-
out the law in ways that already are being recognized.
Pervasive interrelatedness is distinctive but not unique to environ-
mental law. Environmental law is inherently linked to ecology, the
science of the environment, by virtue of the fields' mutual focus on
the environment. Because ecology forms the basis for our under-
standing of the environment, environmental law must incorporate
ecology's insights if it has any hope of functioning as intended, re-
gardless what that intent is. Accordingly, because pervasive interrelat-
edness is such a central feature of the environment and a core precept
of ecology, environmental law constantly faces the task of regulating
in a context of pervasive interrelatedness. Environmental law both re-
sponds to pervasive interrelatedness and works through pervasively in-
terrelated mechanisms. Thus, in Massachusetts v. EPA,243 the Supreme
Court recognized that new motor vehicles in the United States were
among the many sources of emissions of greenhouse gases causing the
climate change that is increasing sea levels and inundating coastal
lands. The Court further found that regulation of such emissions
under the Clean Air Act may slow the rate of climate change, thereby
reducing the extent to which coastal lands are inundated by rising
seas.
2 4 4
238 Smith, supra note 226, at 1000.
239 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 208.
240 Lessig, supra note 1, at 502.
241 Id. at 503.
242 See supra Part II.C.2.
243 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
244 Id. at 521-26.
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Pervasive interrelationships are unavoidable in environmental
law, and environmental law grapples with pervasive interrelatedness to
a greater extent than other areas of law. Indeed, western law has ex-
hibited a strong tradition of attempting to limit the scope of the inter-
relationships it considers-for example, by limiting liability through
the application of proximate cause-and environmental law can be
seen in some respects as challenging that tradition and the assump-
tion that the law can function effectively without considering a
broader range of interrelationships. 245 This tension explains why so
many of the canonical Supreme Court cases involving standing, which
excludes potential plaintiffs from court if their alleged injury is linked
too indirectly to the conduct they challenge, 246 are environmental-law
cases, 24 7 which necessarily involve complex webs of causation.
Pervasive interrelatedness of the natural environment is distinc-
tive to environmental law, but pervasive interrelatedness more gener-
ally is not unique to the natural environment. The experiences from
environmental law's application in the pervasively interrelated context
of the natural environment have important lessons for the application
of law in other contexts in which interrelatedness is present but not as
obvious. For example, some of the theories and management tech-
niques that environmental law and ecology have employed to deal
with pervasive interrelatedness, such as adaptive management, com-
plexity theory, and chaos theory,248 also show significant promise for
application outside of environmental law. 249 More generally, the con-
245 See PtATER ET AL., supra note 176, at 5 (associating environmental law with "a desire
for broadened accountings ... of the full consequences of human decisionmaking").
246 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 434 n.23 (1998) (noting that
standing requirements preclude claims for which "the chain of causation between the chal-
lenged action and the alleged injury [i]s too attenuated").
247 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973).
248 SeeJonathan Z. Cannon, Adaptive Management in Superfund: Thinking Like a Contami-
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cept of pervasive interrelatedness highlights how dividing the law into
insular subfields obscures important interrelationships among differ-
ent areas of the law and supports an agenda of aggressively pursuing
integration of legal doctrine and theory across legal fields.
CONCLUSION
Environmental law cannot be reduced to a set of fundamental
unifying legal principles. Rather, the dominant characteristic of envi-
ronmental lawmaking has been ad-hoc muddling through, and this
characteristic is reflected in the complexity and diversity of environ-
mental-law doctrine. But this apparent doctrinal incoherence does
not mean that environmental law lacks a conceptual core or that it is
not a legal field. An area of law is a legal field if it exhibits patterns
associated with common and distinctive features that predominate
within the area to an extent that justifies studying the area as a distinct
category of legal situations. We can cohere an area of law into a field
by employing an organizational framework to highlight the distinctive
patterns associated with the field.
Applying this methodology to environmental law, environmental
law as a legal field is best understood conceptually as a category of
situations that involve physical public resources subject to numerous,
pervasively interrelated uses. Conflicts among these uses are inevita-
ble and create trade-offs. These use-conflict trade-offs define the
choices facing environmental-lawmaking institutions.
This use-conflict framework for environmental law is superior to
other explanations of environmental law because it focuses on fea-
tures that are common and distinctive to environmental law and that
explain the fundamental difficulties of lawmaking in the environmen-
tal context. It does so, moreover, with a relatively value-neutral ap-
proach. Unlike explanations of environmental law that are tethered
to environmentalism, market capitalism, or other ideological commit-
ments, the use-conflict framework does not assume any particular
baseline by which to judge alternative options and does not favor any
particular use of the environment as normatively superior. By thus
adopting a relatively value-neutral approach, the use-conflict frame-
work facilitates critical analysis of a full range of alternatives.
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